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THE CORPORATION REBORN: FROM
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY TO SHARED
GOVERNANCE
GRANT M. HAYDEN*
*

MATTHEW T. BODIE *

Abstract: The consensus around shareholder primacy is crumbling. Investors,
long assumed to be uncomplicated profit-maximizers, are looking for ways to
express a wider range of values in allocating their funds. Workers are agitating
for greater voice at their workplaces. And prominent legislators have recently
proposed corporate law reforms that would put a sizable number of employee
representatives on the boards of directors of large public companies. These
rumblings of public discontent are echoed in recent corporate law scholarship,
which has cataloged the costs of shareholder control, touted the advantages of
nonvoting stock, and questioned whether activist holders of various stripes are
acting in the company's best interests. Academics who support stronger shareholder rights are accused of pandering to special interest groups or naively
seeking a panacea in a plebiscite. As critical theorists have documented over
time, the foundations of the shareholder primacy model have always been
compromised. In particular, the arguments for a core feature of the modern
corporation-the exclusive shareholder franchise-have been revealed as the
product of flawed assumptions, misapplied social choice theory, and a failure
to hold true to the fundamental precepts of standard economics. It is time to
look at such governance features anew, and reorient the literature around the
basic purpose of corporations: to provide a legal mechanism for business
firms to engage in the process of joint production. In this Article, we present a
new shared governance model, one that builds on the longstanding theory of
the firm as well as a novel theory of democratic participation. These twin arguments, economic and political, both counsel in favor of extending the corporate franchise to employees as well as shareholders, and, importantly, provide a way to distinguish these two constituencies from other corporate stake( 2020, Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie. All rights reserved.
* Professor, SMU-Dedman School of Law.
** Callis Family Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law.
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SMU-Dedman School of Law and Saint Louis University School of Law for their research sup-
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holders when it comes to governance rights. We conclude by assessing the
current status of a shared governance system in Germany and advocating for
further theoretical and empirical inquiry into shared governance structures that
provide for joint shareholder and employee participation.
INTRODUCTION

It is a remarkable moment in corporate law. Everything is about to
change. The status quo of shareholder primacy clings stubbornly on, full of
its old power in appearance, and yet it is a fagade. It is the Soviet Union
after the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is Persia after Thermopylae, the British
Raj after the Salt March, disco after the Ramones. We are at the beginning
of the end.
This claim may seem absurd in light of the dominance of shareholder
primacy theory throughout the United States, the European Union, and developing nations. The academic network behind shareholder primacy remains resolute; almost all corporate law scholarship pivots around the central idea of shareholder control.' It is almost twenty years since Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman's declaration about the end of corporate
law history, 2 and shareholder wealth maximization remains the governing
norm.

But underneath the superficial agreement is a roiling mass of disputes
and divisions. The field is more fractured than ever before. The prospect of
real shareholder empowerment, through proxy access or shareholder bylaws, has split the academy into subgroups that advocate for divergent approaches. 3 Activist investors have gone from the saviors of shareholder
rights 4 to short-term opportunists who should be marginalized. 5 Money is
1Ann M. Lipton, ShareholderDivorce Court, 44 J. CORP. L. 297, 300 (2018) ("Most modem
theories of the corporation subscribe to what is known as 'shareholder primacy,' i.e., the notion
that directors have, or should have, a commitment to manage the corporation in a manner that
benefits the shareholders.").
2
See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End ofHistoryfor CorporateLaw, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 439 (2001) ("There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law
should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.").
3 See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 1, at 300 (discussing "sharply divergent views of the precise
nature of directors' legal obligations"). The Bainbridge-Bebchuk debate over the role of shareholder participation in management is one example. Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Casefor
Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 835 (2005) (arguing that shareholders
should have increased governance power), with Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) (advocating for a
director primacy model).
4 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund
Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1089 (2015) (noting research in finance that "public disclosures of the purchase of a significant stake by an activist . .. are accompanied by significant positive
stock-price reactions as well as followed by subsequent improvements in operating performance");
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being shoveled like never before into passive index funds and exchangetraded funds-the absentee landlords of stock ownership. 6 Important recent
scholarship focuses on the problems of "principal costs" generated by investor governance7 and touts the advantages of nonvoting shares." Leaders
in the field such as Nobel Laureate Oliver Hart, 9 Michael Jensen,' 0 and
former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine " are questioning
the stability of shareholder primacy as a regulatory norm. The corporate law
centre cannot hold.
Now that shareholder primacy is losing its grip on the corporate world,
for the first time in a very long time we can start to see the outlines of what
will come after. The next wave in corporate governance is coming, and it
will include workers. For too long, labor has been left outside of the corporate governance gates. But we now see concrete examples of the coming
change. Recent bills proposed by Senators Tammy Baldwin and Elizabeth

Mark Hulbert, A Good Wordfor Hedge FundActivism, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2007), https://www.ny
times.com/2007/02/18/business/younnoney/18stra.html [https://perma.cc/ZDB9-BWNP].
s See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-BloodPerspective
on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870,

1874 (2017) (discussing the dangers of hedge-fund activism); James B. Stewart, Hedge Funds
Should Be Thriving Right Now. They Aren't., N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/07/12/business/hedge-funds.html [https://perma.cc/A6J2-Z2VH].
6 See, e.g., Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493,
494 (2018) (noting that millions of investors have moved their money from actively managed mutual
funds to passively managed funds); Bryan Borzykowski, The Trillion-DollarETF Boom Triggered
by the FinancialCrisisJust Keeps Getting Bigger, CNBC (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/
2018/09/14/the-trillion-dollar-etf-boom-triggered-by-the-financial-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/9T7RE783] ("In 2008, U.S. investors had $531 billion in ETFs; that's jumped to more than $3.4 trillion
today, according to Statistica.").
Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, PrincipalCosts: A New Theory for Corporate Law and
Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 770 (2017).

'Dorothy

S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares andEfficient Corporate Governance, 71 STAN. L. REV.

687, 694-700 (2019).
9 Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247, 248 (2017).
10 Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective

Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 235 (2002) (arguing that corporations should pursue "maximization of the long-run value of the firm" rather than shareholder wealth maximization).
" Leo E. Strine Jr., Toward Fairand Sustainable Capitalism: A Comprehensive Proposalto
Help American Workers, Restore Fair GainsharingBetween Employees and Shareholders, and
Increase American Competitiveness by Reorienting Our Corporate Governance System Toward
Sustainable Long-Term Growth and Encouraging Investments in America's Future 1 (Harvard

John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 1018, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3461924 [https://perma.cc/A6JS-RGN] (opining that "[t]he incentive system for the governance of American corporations has failed in recent decades to adequately encourage long-term investment, sustainable business practices, and most importantly, fair
gainsharing between shareholders and workers.").
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Warren provide workers with representation on the board of directors.' 2 The
Walkout for Change by Google workers demanded, in part, the appointment
of an employee representative to Google's board.1 3 The German system of
codetermination, where workers elect up to half the members of the corporate supervisory board, showed its strength and resilience in the recovery
from the global economic crisis. 14 And new managerial methodologies
providing for participatory management and employee voice are increasingly popular around the globe.' 5 Policymakers, workers' advocates, and workers themselves are looking anew at the corporate structure and asking why
workers have been left out.
Despite these murmurings of fundamental change, corporations have
more legal and economic power than ever before. Over the last decade, corporate profits have hovered between nine and eleven percent of the U.S.
gross domestic product-the highest sustained average percentage on record.1 6 Recent tax changes have dramatically slashed corporate tax bills and
returned billions of dollars to corporate coffers.' 7 And the power of the corporate form continues to expand. By providing corporations with individualized constitutional and statutory rights of expression, the Supreme Court's
decisions in Citizens United v FederalElection Commission 8 and Burwell
" Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); Reward Work Act, S. 2605,
115th Cong. (2018).
1 Noam Scheiber, Google Workers Reject Silicon Valley Individualism in
Walkout, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/business/google-employee-walkout-labor.html
[https://perma.cc/285Q-K3A2]; see also Sheera Frenkel, Mike Isaac, Cecilia Kang & Gabriel J.X.
Dance, Facebook Employees Stage Virtual Walkout to Protest Trump Posts, N.Y. TIMES (June 1,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/technology/facebook-employee-protest-trump.html [https://
perma.cc/WRB2-PVNS].
14 See infra Part III.C.
15 See, e.g., FREDERIC LALOUX, REINVENTING ORGANIZATIONS: A GUIDE TO CREATING
ORGANIZATIONS INSPIRED BY THE NEXT STAGE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS (2014); BRIAN J.
ROBERTSON, HOLACRACY: THE NEW MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR A RAPIDLY CHANGING

WORLD (2015).
16 CorporateProfitsAfter Tax (Without IVA and CCAdj)/Gross Domestic Product, FED. RES.

BANK ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1Pik [https://perma.cc/4D9X-NM4G]; see
also Tim Worstall, Why Have CorporateProfits Been Rising as a Percentageof GDP? Globalisa-

tion, FORBES (May 7, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/05/07/why-havecorporate-profits-been-rising-as-a-percentage-of-gdp-globalisation/#6a27a3fb2a6e
[https://perma.
cc/2XBL-H78U]. At the same time, workers' wages and salaries have reached their lowest percentage of GDP. Compensation of Employees: Wages and Salary Accruals/GrossDomestic Product, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g-2Xa [https://perma.cc/FC3J5H9C]; Michael Madowitz & Seth Hanlon, GDP Is Growing, but Workers' Wages Aren't, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 26, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/
2018/07/26/454087/gdp-growing-workers-wages-arent/ [https://perma.cc/FZ7M-7EAB].
17 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (cutting the corporate tax rate from 35% to 20%).
18 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 19 have extended the corporation's powers even
more deeply into politics, religion, and culture. This unprecedented extension of corporate power renders the law of corporate governance more important than ever before. Within the corporation, the shareholder franchise
has long been the critical control feature. The justifications for this exclusivity are well worn at this point, even if they remain somewhat slippery.
One model describes the corporation as a nexus of freely bargained contracts, and therefore presumptively the most efficient way to structure firm
governance. 20 Another justification is that shareholders are owners of the
corporate residual, and they have the appropriate incentives to make good
firm decisions. 2 ' Rights to the residual provide shareholders with a common
interest in maximizing corporate profits, which reduces their tendency to
squabble about firm decisions and allegedly eliminates the possibility of
voting cycles infecting board elections.22 Scholars who believe in shareholder wealth maximization but nevertheless believe in centralized board
authority have tinkered around the edges of these standard economic accounts by emphasizing the importance of board or managerial discretion. 23
But these traditional arguments for the shareholder franchise are falling apart-not only from criticisms by outsiders, but also through conflicts
from inside the house. It is now well-recognized that shareholders across
the board have heterogeneous, rather than homogenous, interests that diverge along a number of dimensions.2 4 Scholars are losing trust in share-

573 U.S. 682 (2014).
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 9 (2002) ("The dominant model of the corporation in legal scholarship is the so-called
nexus of contracts theory."); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The CorporateContract,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) ("The corporation is a complex set of explicit and implicit
contracts, and corporate law enables the participants to select the optimal arrangement for the
many different sets of risks and opportunities that are available in a large economy.").
19

20

21

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPO-

RATE LAW 67-68 (1991) (justifying the corporate franchise based on shareholders' interests in the
residual).
22 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in CorporateLaw, 26 J.L. & ECON.
395, 405 (1983) (discussing KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d

ed. 1963)).
23 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3; Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy,
Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169,
1184 (2013).
24 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 791 (describing "several sources of conflict among
shareholders, including differing investment horizons and needs for cash payouts, empty voting,
and competing outside interests"); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote
and the False Promise of ShareholderHomogeneity, 30 CARDozo L. REV. 445, 505 (2008) ("It is
becoming increasingly clear, for example, that shareholders have many different types of interests
in a corporation.").
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holders with significant power,25 and there is even support for nonvoting
shares and passive shareholding. 26 Those academics who support strengthened shareholder power are accused of supporting special interests and
shadow agendas. 27 The house of the exclusive shareholder franchise is collapsing in on itself.
With the standard economic approaches on the ropes, we'd expect to
see alternatives rise to fill the gaps in corporate governance theory. But
there is a dearth of such alternatives. Most progressive scholars, at this
point, have left the shareholder franchise alone and cross their fingers for
more ecumenical firm decision-making.28 Stakeholder advocates have not
put forth convincing theoretical distinctions among constituencies that
might tell us which group preferences are best captured by governance and
which by contract. 29 The growth of B-Corps and benefit corporations has
created a parallel corporate ecosystem outside of the traditional one where
shareholder primacy has been watered down or diminished-but not replaced. 30 Even those who dare to dream big have-up to now-checked

25 Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1258 (2008) ("[A]ctivist shareholders are using their growing influence not to improve
overall firm performance, as has generally been assumed, but to profit at other shareholders' expense."); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1750 (2006) ("[S]hareholder voting is properly understood not as a primary
component of the corporate decisionmaking structure, but rather as an accountability device of last
resort, to be used sparingly, at most.").
26 Lund, supra note 8, at 697-98; Lund, supra note 6, at 497 (arguing that passive funds
should not have voting rights).
27 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 1754 (claiming that Lucian Bebchuk's argument for
shareholder empowerment would help "precisely the institutions most likely to use their position
to self-deal that is, to take a non-pro rata share of the firm's assets and earnings-or otherwise to
reap private benefits not shared with other investors"); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by
Ordinary Investors? A PragmaticReaction to the Dueling IdeologicalMythologists of Corporate
Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 451 (2014) ("Bebchuk is the sincere champion of one group of
'agents' wielding power and authority over others' money the money managers who control
most of the investments belonging ultimately to ordinary Americans who are saving to pay for
their retirements and for their children's education against another group of 'agents' that he
believes is somehow more conflicted the agents who actually manage corporations that make
real products and deliver useful services (i.e. 'productive corporations').").
" See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 290-91 (1999) (describing directors as trustees for stakeholders).
29 Kent Greenfield has come the closest to proposing a redesigned board of directors, but he
did not lay out specifics. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 149 (2006) ("The specifics will be difficult
but not impossible: employees could elect a proportion of the board; communities in which the
company employs a significant percentage of the workforce could be asked to propose a representative to the board; long-term business partners and creditors could be represented as well.").
30 Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Formsfor Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681, 682
(2013) ("Enthusiasts argue social enterprises will have a more positive and sustainable impact on
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their expectations at the door. 31 Forces are amassing but still scattered and

diffuse.
The reconstruction of corporate governance theory, at minimum, needs
to reassess which stakeholders should have their preferences captured
through the most powerful feature of corporate control-voting-and, just
as importantly, which stakeholders should not. To answer this question, we
will return to the theory of the firm and reconsider the purposes of corporations and what it means for governance. We will also develop a new theory
of democratic participation designed to assess which interested parties
should have their preferences captured through an electoral process. Both of
these theories-the economic theory of the firm and the political theory of
democratic participation-support a model that incorporates employees expressly into the inner sanctum of corporate governance. And both of these
theories also give us the tools to distinguish between insiders-shareholders
and employees-and other stakeholders whose interests in a typical corporation are best captured in ways other than voting rights.
In sum, this Article catalogs the main shortcomings of existent corporate governance theory and proposes a shared governance model of the firm
to replace it. We begin, in Part I, by recounting the intellectual foundations
of the shareholder primacy norm. 32 In doing so, we will focus on the core
feature of that norm-the exclusive shareholder franchise-and the arguments put forth in support of it. 33 These arguments have a range of problems: they are based on a number of faulty empirical assumptions; they
misapply basic economic and social choice theory; and, in the end, they
often rely on a bit wishful thinking on the part of legal scholars determined
to paper over the cracks in their theories. 34 This has left the scholarly case
for shareholder voting-most of which comes out of the law and economics
tradition-on the verge of collapse. 35
In the central sections of the Article, we develop a theory of shared
corporate governance. In Part II, we begin to reconstruct corporate governance scholarship by returning to and reinvigorating the longstanding theory

people and planet than ordinary for-profit businesses."); Heerad Sabeti, The For-Benefit Enterprise, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2011, at 98.
" Brett H. McDonnell, Strategiesfor an Employee Role in Corporate Governance,
46 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 429, 442 (2011) (stating that "large legal changes that would strongly encourage
or mandate significant employee involvement [in corporate governance] are politically quite unlikely to succeed").
32 See infra Part I.
3 See infra notes 41-64 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 65-130 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 131-138 and accompanying text.
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of the firm. 36 This theory, born out of a desire to explain why business firms
exist apart from markets in the first place, not only is consistent with but
also militates in favor of greater employee participation in corporate governance.3 7 As participants in joint production, employees should also have
voting rights within the firm. In Part III, we develop a new theory of democratic participation that helps explain which corporate constituents should
be extended the corporate franchise rights (and, just as importantly, which
should not). 38 This theory-fully consistent with mainstream democratic
theory and informed by voting rights jurisprudence-also counsels in favor
of extending voting rights to employees in ordinary corporate governance
situations. 39 We will also present the example of German codetermination
as an empirical proof of concept.4 0 In the end, the economic theory of the
firm and the democratic theory of participation provide the foundation for a
new vision of corporate governance, one that includes workers and shareholders, labor and equity, for the benefit of all corporate stakeholders.
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ITS DISCONTENTS

A. ShareholderPrimacyand the Exclusive Franchise
Shareholder primacy, a version of corporate governance that assigns
priority to shareholder interests above all others, has been the consensus
governance model in corporate law for at least thirty years, and arguably for
over a century. 4' The exclusive right of shareholders to elect the board of
directors has been around even longer, dating back to the proliferation of
corporations in the nineteenth century.4 But while corporate law currently
embodies both of these governing principles, they are not necessary components of the corporate form.

36 See infra Part II.

37 See infra notes

139-260 and accompanying text.

38 See infra Part III.
39 See infra notes 261-323

and accompanying text.

See infra notes 324-359 and accompanying text.
41 Delaware law, which holds primacy of place in our corporate law ecosystem, has consistently upheld the shareholder primacy norm. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345,
360 (Del. 1993) ("[D]irectors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests
of the corporation and to act in the best interests of its shareholders."); see also E. Norman Veasey, Should CorporationLaw Inform Aspirationsfor Good Corporate Governance Practices-or
Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2184 (2001) (stating that Delaware law adopts the norm of
shareholder primacy).
42 See Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation:Insightsfrom the History
of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1351-53 (2006) (noting that shareholders have had voting power extending back to the earliest corporations).
41
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Under our federalized system, corporations are creatures of state corporate law. Even though state corporate law allows for a great deal of organizational flexibility, actual governance structures are remarkably uniform. Delaware corporate law, for example, does not even require a corporation to have a board, 43 and yet all corporations have them. The board controls the firm and has the ability to legally bind the corporation to its decisions. 44 Shareholders elect the directors at the annual shareholders meeting
by in-person voting or the use of proxies. 45 Directors must act in the corporation's interests and are bound by certain fiduciary duties, primarily the
duties of good faith, care, and loyalty.46 However, directors generally delegate the actual job of running the business to the corporation's executive
officers, primarily through a hierarchy of employees headed by the chief
executive officer. 47 This structure, where shareholders elect the directors
who in turn select the officers to run the corporation, replicates itself in corporations from every state. And the critical feature of corporate governance
control-who gets to vote, about what, and under what circumstances-has
also been fixed: the corporate franchise belongs to shareholders and shareholders alone.
Shareholders have held the right to vote within the corporation since its
inception. 4 8 Although shareholder primacy has its roots in the 1919 Michigan
Supreme Court case Dodge v. FordMotor Co., 49 it did not achieve full force
until the law and economics movement in corporate law combined with the
advantageous tax treatment of stock options.5 0 By the mid-2000s, the share-

43 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2019).
44
Id. § 141(c)(1)-(2).
45
Id. § 211(b).
46 Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 86 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell

eds., 2012).
47 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) ("Every corporation organized under this chapter
shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the board of directors which is not inconsistent with the bylaws .... ").
48 Dunlavy, supra note 42, at 1351-53.
49 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
s Shareholder primacy proponents touted the importance of stock-oriented performance incentives for management to provide the proper incentives. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J.
Murphy, CEO Incentives It's Not How Much You Pay, but How, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June
1990, at 138. In 1993, Congress amended the tax code to prohibit the deduction of executive compensation over $1,000,000 unless it was performance-based. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2018); see Gregg D.
Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.

877, 879 (2007) ("The purpose of this legislation was to enhance shareholder wealth in two ways:
by reducing the overall level of executive compensation and by influencing the composition of
executive compensation arrangements in favor of components that were more sensitive to firm
performance."). The end result was a dramatic increase in the use of stock options in executive

2020]

The CorporationReborn

2429

holder primacy norm oriented not only academic theory but also boardroom
practice.
The classic justification for the shareholder franchise is that shareholders are the "owners" of the corporation and therefore should have the right
to control it.5 1 The law and economics justification has centered around the
shareholder's right to the "residual"-namely, the residual profits remaining
after all other claimants have been paid.52 Because shareholders are paid
last, the argument goes, they have the best set of incentives for governing
the company. 53 Along with the shareholder primacy norm, the "nexus of
contracts" theory of the corporation is also popular in economics and legal
academic circles. 54 Under this theory, the corporation does not really exist
and instead should best be considered as a cluster of contractual agreements
among a variety of parties. The nexus of contracts approach counsels for a
"hands-off' or default-rule approach to corporate law, as the corporation is
conceived as a set of voluntarily chosen relationships between different parties.55
In their foundational work on the law and economics of corporate law,
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel married these two theories into a
simple, intertwined structure. Their book, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 56 reaffirmed the shareholder primacy norm by arguing that
shareholders are the most economically vulnerable of the corporation's participants. This vulnerability, coupled with their shared preference for wealth
maximization, means that shareholders should be accorded the basic governance rights of the corporation.5 7 Thus, according to Easterbrook and
Fischel, the other participants in the corporation agreed, through their own
contracts, to provide shareholders with residual rights to the corporation's
compensation. Polsky, supra, at 906 ("It is widely believed that § 162(m) contributed significantly
to the explosion of compensatory stock options that began in the late 1990s.").
51 Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1189, 1190-92 (2002). This is one of the "bad" arguments. Id.
52 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 67 ("The reason [that shareholders
vote] is
that the shareholders are the residual claimants to the firm's income.").
5 See MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOV-

ERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 21 (1995) ("Because shareholders are in this residual claim position, most economists argue that they have the greatest incentive to see that the company makes good business decisions and uses its assets wisely to earn profits.").
5 See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Voting and the Symbolic Politics
of Corporation as Contract, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 513 (2018).

5 Cf Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84
NW. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990) (developing the "triviality hypothesis" namely, that "appearances notwithstanding, state corporate law is trivial: it does not prevent companies managers and
investors together from establishing any set of governance rules they want").
56 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21.

5 Id. at 67-68.
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profits and the voting rights that come with them. 58 The shareholder primacy norm provided the overriding purpose to the corporate form, while the
nexus of contracts theory demonstrated how the parties reached this arrangement through voluntary agreements.
From this core law and economics framework have blossomed divergent approaches to some of the central corporate debates of the last twenty
years. One group of theorists has focused on providing shareholders with
stronger legal powers within the corporation.59 Such powers include the power over corporate political spending, the right to access the company's proxy
ballot, and a prohibition on staggered boards. 60 Others, such as Steven
Bainbridge's director primacy theory 6 1 and Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout's
team production theory, 62 rallied around various versions of board primacy.
Although these board primacy scholars disagree with each other on the appropriate goals of the corporation, they all believe that a governance system
that is less responsive to shareholders will allow the board to make better
decisions.63
Significantly, all of these theorists, like Easterbrook and Fischel before
them, are committed to corporate governance structures in which shareholders alone elect board members and vote on other matters of importance.
The original justifications for the exclusive shareholder franchise, many of
which are now more than four decades old, continue to be cited, recited, and
relied upon by the universe of scholars of corporate governance. 64
B. Cracks in the FoundationalArguments
While these arguments for the shareholder franchise continue to hold
sway, substantial cracks have appeared in their foundations. 65 As we catalog
these arguments and some of their shortcomings, it is important to realize
that our critiques do not question the basic principles of standard economics
or social choice theory thought to underlie the arguments. Instead, we take
58 Id.

at 17, 37.

59 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 3 (arguing for greater shareholder power).
60 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Casefor ShareholderAccess: A
Response to the Business Roundtable, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 557 (2005); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered

Boards: FurtherFindings and a Reply to Symposium Participants,55 STAN. L. REV. 885 (2002).

Bainbridge, supra note 3.
Blair & Stout, supra note 28.
63 See Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the
Curious Turn
Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2089-92 (2010).
64 Including us.
61

62

65 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21.
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those principles as given, and discuss their misapplication in the context of
corporate governance. It is our sense that corporate governance scholars
often start from basic economic principles only to discard them when they
run into (what they perceive as) problems. These arguments, in other words,
will be evaluated by the standards that their proponents set for themselves.
1. The Contractarian Argument
One of the most basic arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise is that it, like any feature of corporate governance, is presumptively
efficient because it is the product of freely bargained contracts. 66 In this
view, the corporation itself is nothing more than a nexus of contracts. 67 Although it's often hard to tell whether the corporation as contract is intended
to be a literal or metaphorical description, there's no doubt that it has done
heavy rhetorical work in the service of the law and economics vision of the
corporation. If all corporate constituents agree to a governance system in
which shareholders alone have voting rights, who's to say they've got it
wrong?
Over time, even the most die-hard contractarians have conceded that
this description of the corporation is not literally true-there are some key
features to modern corporations that cannot be reduced to contract. 68 The
most prominent of these is the signature feature of the corporate form: limited liability. 69 Limited liability cannot be replicated by contract, but is instead a concession granted by the state to corporations in exchange for the
ability to tax and regulate them in various ways. 70 Corporations are not re66 For extensive discussion of this argument, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus
of Contracts" Corporation:A CriticalAppraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the
Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819 (1999); Hayden & Bodie, supra note 54; Grant M. Hayden & Matthew

T. Bodie, The Uncorporationand the Unraveling of "Nexus of Contracts" Theory, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 1127 (2011); Michael Klausner, The ContractarianTheory of CorporateLaw: A Generation

Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779 (2006); Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to
Corporations:A Comment on EasterbrookandFischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449 (1989).
67 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) (providing the original
description of the theory); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 1-39 (providing
one of the most prominent iterations of the theory).
68 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 67-75 (2010) (describing the

mandatory elements of the corporate structure); Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field: A Critique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1537 (1989)
("Admittedly, as a descriptive matter state corporation codes and other sources of law contain
many mandatory terms that parties cannot contract around .... [T]o claim that contractarians
would deny the existence of coercive legal rules is to accuse them of blindness or stupidity.").
69 See RIBSTEIN, supra note 68, at 79; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 66, at 1137-39.
7 See RIBSTEIN, supra note 68, at 138; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 66, at 1138.
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ducible to a set of contracts; indeed, if contracts were sufficient, then there
would be no need for corporate law in the first place."
As corporate governance theorists shifted to using the nexus of contracts more metaphorically, their reliance on contract theory becomes
somewhat self-defeating. 72 Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, argue that
corporate law provides the "ideal" contract that most participants would
themselves develop and saves the parties from the transaction costs of developing it on their own. 73 This argument, though, proves too much, as the
theory then assigns itself with the task of assigning preferences-something
that economists are generally loath to do. Moreover, the preferences of
these particular hypothetical constituents do not reflect the preferences of
actual constituents, even the shareholders themselves. And there's certainly
no independent reason to think that the rest of the corporate constituents
would agree on such particularized governance features like the exclusive
shareholder franchise. 74
This contractarian theory of the corporation turns out to be based on
idealized, fictionalized versions of shareholders and other corporate constituents. And these fictional constituents, by and large, just happen to agree
with normative law and economics principles and the current structures of
corporate governance. 75 But their supposed approval of every contemporary
feature of corporate governance is nothing more than Panglossian wish fulfillment on the part of their creators. In the end, this contractarian argument
in favor of the exclusive shareholder franchise is both descriptively wrong
and normatively hollow.
2. The Residual Argument
The principle that all shareholders have a similar interest in the corporate residual, the leftover operating profit after all the costs have been paid,
has long been central to the idea of shareholder voting. 76 Because maximizing the residual maximizes the return to shareholders while leaving all other
constituents (like creditors, employees, and suppliers) contractually satisHayden & Bodie, supra note 66, at 1127 ("A corporation is not a contract.").
For a more complete description and critical evaluation of this move to metaphor to save
the contractarian position, see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 54, at 538-46.
73 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20, at 1418 (observing that "much of corporate law
is designed to reduce the costs of aligning the interests of managers and investors").
74 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 54, at 539-41.
75 See id. at 541-42. For a more extensive discussion of this idea, see Daniel J.H. Greenwood,
71

72

FictionalShareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L.

REV. 1021 (1996).
76 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 67-69.
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fied, under this theory shareholder control over a corporation will increase
efficiency by maximizing residual profits.7 7
According to shareholder primacy theory, shareholders are best positioned to be assigned the vote because they have relatively homogeneous
interests in maximizing the residual. 78 More specifically, they alone have a
single-minded focus on corporate profits. 79 Over the last couple of decades,
however, this assumption of shareholder homogeneity has broken down. 80
Many shareholders have interests in the firm that go beyond a simple desire
to maximize the residual, including majority shareholders, shareholders
with disproportionate voting rights, members of voting trusts, bribed shareholders, hedged shareholders, sovereign wealth funds, and employee and
management shareholders. 8' In each case, those shareholders have interests
that may temper or override their shared interest in the residual. In addition,
shareholder heterogeneity is not simply a matter of shareholders with discrete competing interests. There is also heterogeneity among otherwise similarly situated shareholders with respect to their definitions of wealth maximization-shareholders, for example, with different time horizons or risk
preferences. 82 Defined-benefit pension funds have a definition of wealth
maximization that would lead to different outcomes than a hedge fund, or a
flash trader.
The recent importance of environmental, social, and governance
(ESG) investing highlights another problem with shareholder primacy. As
economists should recognize, shareholder wealth maximization is not the
same thing as shareholder utility maximization. Shareholders do in fact value things other than profit maximization, and corporate governance should
be structured to allow them to express their preferences on tradeoffs in corporate decision-making. 8 3 The recent surge in ESG investing provides tan?? See id. at 35-39, 67-69; see also Sean J. Griffith, Opt-in Stewardship: Toward an Optimal
Delegation ofMutual Fund Voting Authority, 98 TEx. L. REv. 983, 1006 (2020) ("As residual risk
bearers, shareholders are exposed to the consequences of all corporate actions going forward. This
gives shareholders the best incentive of all corporate constituents to monitor corporate decisionmaking. Hence, shareholders alone vote.").
78 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 69-70.
79 See id.; Griffith, supra note 77, at 1009-10 ("[S]hareholder wealth maximization is often
posited or assumed not because it is the highest and best thing for real-life shareholders but because it is the most that can be assumed about shareholders as a class.").
8" See Goshen & Squire, supranote 7, at 791; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 505.
" See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 561, 574-92 (2006); Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 477-98.
" See Anabtawi, supra note 81, at 579-83; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 492-94. For a
thoughtful review of the short-termism debate, see Michal Barzuza & Eric L. Talley, ShortTermism and Long-Termism 12-21 (Va. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 2, 2016).
83 See generally Hart & Zingales, supra note 9 (arguing that shareholders have interests beyond simply maximizing profits).
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gible evidence of disparate shareholder interests, with these funds estimated
to represent one-quarter of the funds under management-roughly $12 trillion. 84 Surveys show that three-quarters of Americans have an interest in
sustainable investing-evidence that non-maximizing investments may continue to grow.8 5 In fact, misguided notions that shareholder wealth maximization is a required investing strategy may be artificially propping up
wealth maximization approaches.8 6
Finally, it is simplistic to say that shareholders are the only ones with
an interest in the long-term value of the corporation. Employees may receive more discrete and regular payments, but they too have an ongoing
interest in the success of the operation. Assuming that employees are paid
by "contracts" that are set in economic stone makes it easy to ignore that,
over time, the corporate power of shareholders puts workers at a significant
bargaining disadvantage. 87 If shareholders alone elect the board, then the
board will naturally favor the will of their electorate. 88 This dynamic has
played out over time: wages have remained stagnant despite a booming
economy, while corporate profits have grown at a staggering rate. 89 Employees may have some market power, but they also have firm-specific capital that cannot be moved, and they generate the value that the firm holds
84 See Mark Miller, Bit by Bit, Socially Conscious InvestorsAre Influencing 401(k) 's, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/business/esg-401k-investing-retirement.html
[https://perma.cc/HZZ3-BZ4R].
85 See Paul Sullivan, Investing for Social Impact Is Complicated Here Are 4 Ways to Simplify

It., N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/03/your-money/impact-investingstandards.html [https://perma.cc/CY6J-WA8U]; see also Dieter Holger, What GenerationIs Leading the Way in ESG Investing? You'll Be Surprised., WALL STREET J. (Sept. 10, 2019), https://
www.wsj .com/articles/what-generation-is-leading-the-way-in-esg-investing-youll-be-surprised-11
568167440 [https://perma.cc/K5LR-95QB] (noting that millennials have the highest percentage of
interest in ESG investing, but that Gen X is catching up in interest and likely has more ESG assets
under management).
86 Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: FiduciaryDuties and ESG Integration, 90

U. COLO. L. REV. 731, 734-35 (2019) ("[D]ue to outdated understandings of 'social investing,'
some decision makers still worry that any strategy that considers environmental or social impacts
will breach their fiduciary duties.").
87 BLAIR, supra note 53, at 256-57.

88 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is CorporatePurpose II: An Encouragementfor Future Considerationfrom ProfessorsJohnson and Millon, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165, 1177
(2017) ("The boards of these corporations did not view themselves as having any national loyalties or loyalties to other constituencies, they viewed themselves as elected officials in the republic
of equity capital.").
89 See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913:
Evidence from CapitalizedIncome Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519 (2016) (discussing diverging income inequality); Floyd Norris, Corporate Profits Grow and Wages Slide, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/05/business/economy/corporate-profits-grow-ever-larger-asslice-of-economy-as-wages-slide.html [https://perma.cc/J4AE-E8EJ] (discussing the rise in corporate profits and fall of employee compensation).
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through its brand, trademark, and good will. 90 Because shareholders control
the company, they control the brand, the goodwill, the ongoing business.
Combined with the at-will rule and the dramatic decline in union representation, employees have remarkably little power within the firm, despite their
ongoing interest in the business.
3. The Arrow's Theorem Argument
Shareholder heterogeneity also undercuts another fairly prominent argument for the exclusive shareholder franchise: the argument from Arrow's
theorem. Easterbrook and Fischel first raised concerns, based on Kenneth
Arrow's impossibility theorem, that corporate constituents with heterogeneous preferences would be more likely to produce intransitive election results
or voting cycles. 91 This, in turn, would lead firms to "self-destruct." 92 This
argument has since been repeated by a wide range of law and economics
corporate governance scholars. 93
As discussed earlier, shareholders actually have quite heterogeneous
preferences with respect to corporate decision-making. But the Arrow's theorem argument falls apart long before we get to the nature of shareholder
preferences: it is based on a misguided application of the theorem from the
start.94 First, even if shareholders agree on an underlying goal of wealth
maximization, that does not mean they agree on the best strategies or board
candidates to achieve that goal. 95 Second, the argument ignores the enormous
democratic cost of avoiding possible voting cycles: prohibiting interested parties from voting based upon their purported preferences. 96 Third, the argu90 Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm,
51 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 345, 363 (2009) ("The positive reputation associated with a trademark is due to
the work of many persons associated with the firm owning that mark over time."). Unlike employees' general skills that could be used anywhere, firm-specific capital refers to employees' specific
knowledge or skills that are tied to a particular company. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.

Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists:An Economic Inquiry into the CorporateLaw

Firm and How PartnersSplit Profits, 37 STAN. L. REv. 313, 354 (1985) (distinguishing human
capital, which the person carries with them (such as education), from firm-specific capital, which
is lost when the employee leaves the firm to go to another).
91 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at
69-70.
92 Id. at 70.
&

93 See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 41-42 (1996); Blair

Stout, supra note 28, at 257; Gregory K. Dow, The New InstitutionalEconomics and Employment
Regulation, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 57, 69 (Bruce

E. Kaufman ed., 1997).
94 For a critical evaluation of this argument, see Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie, Arrow 's
Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1217 (2009). For a con-

densed version, see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 54, at 524-30.
95 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 94, at 1230-32.
96 See id. at 1232-34.
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ment utterly fails to analyze the likelihood or cost of cyclical election outcomes in corporate elections, and, under some fairly straightforward assumptions, both are likely to be very low or nonexistent. 97 The argument from Arrow's theorem for the exclusive shareholder franchise is not at all compelling.
4. The Argument for Board Primacy
Competing corporate law theories in the law and economics tradition
sometimes offer more realistic stories about corporate law doctrine. But
they also do little to question the underlying structures of corporate control. 98 Stephen Bainbridge's "director primacy" theory well describes the
ambivalence of Delaware corporate law towards the relationship between
shareholders and the board of directors. 99 But his theory ultimately fails to
explain why directors should be given relatively unchecked authority over
the operation of the firm. 100 Similarly, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout's
"team production" model accurately takes into account the many participants in the life of the corporation.' 0 ' Their model, however, also leaves it
to a shareholder-elected board to somehow manage these relationships appropriately. 0 2
Whether they be "Platonic guardians" (Bainbridge) 03 or "mediating
hierarchs" (Blair and Stout), 44 there are no governance structures in place
to ensure that actual directors live up to the faith that these accounts place in
their ability to manage the firm for all constituents. In both cases, the ultimate check on the board is left in the hands of the shareholders alone. And
both simply rely on earlier law and economics arguments to justify the retention of the exclusive shareholder franchise. 0 5 Those committed to board
primacy provide no independent arguments for this fundamental mechanism
of corporate control.

97 See id. at 1234-39.
98

For an overview and critical evaluation of the various forms of board primacy theory, see

Hayden & Bodie, supra note 63.
99

See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY

AND PRACTICE (2008) (discussing the tension between shareholders and the board of directors in
corporate governance).
100 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 63, at 2089-92.
1 See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 28 (recognizing that integrating many participants
in a public corporation can lead to qualitatively different results).
102 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 63, at 2089-91, 2112-20.
103 Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 560.
104 Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at
280.
105 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 63, at
2101-11.
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C. New Challengesfor the Primacy Model
Along with the flaws in the traditional law and economics model for
corporate law, there are new concerns about the tremendous weight placed
on shareholders within the model: specifically, the idea of shareholder
wealth maximization as the focus of the enterprise, as well as the ability of
shareholders to handle their governance responsibilities. These developments provide additional momentum for rethinking corporate governance.
1. A Return to Corporate Purpose
Since the early twentieth century, the idea that a corporation has a particular "purpose" for itself has pretty much been a nonstarter. But corporate
law originally required corporations to establish a specific purpose as part
of the incorporation process. 106 The purpose specified the nature of the
business to be established and provided a sense of the corporation's scope.
In a real sense, the purpose established the legal boundaries of activities for
participants within the firm. 107 The purpose requirement was enforced
through a legal action based on ultra vires, or "beyond the powers." Under
this doctrine, shareholders could sue the corporation if it went beyond the
scope of its purpose, as established in the charter.1 08 Because it limited the
reach of corporate power to enumerated purposes, the ultra vires doctrine
was "an important tool to protect the state's interest in restricting the power
and size of corporations and to protect the shareholders from managerial
overreaching."109
As corporations became more commonplace and less attention was
paid to the specific charters, the ultra vires doctrine began to break down.
Although ultra vires prohibitions remain on the books in almost every

106 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 554-55 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in part)
("At first, corporations could be formed under the general laws only for a limited number of purposes .... ").

107 JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-

TIONS AGGREGATE 60 (Morton J. Horwitz & Stanley N. Katz eds., Arno Press Inc. 1972) (1832)
("[T]he general powers of a corporate body must be restricted by the nature and object of its institution.").
108 Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, a Prod, and a Big Stick: An Evaluation
of ClassActions, ShareholderProposals and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as Methodsfor Controlling
Corporate Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 929, 930 (2005) ("The ultra vires doctrine historically
allowed a shareholder to sue to prevent a company from engaging in an activity outside of the
specific parameters of its corporate charter.").
109 Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A StakeholderAnalysis of Corporate Illegality (with
Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce InternationalLaw Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279,

1302 (2001).

2438

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 61:7

state," 0 corporations learned to have as broad of a corporate purpose as
possible."' Today, even though corporations are allowed to have specific
purposes, for-profit companies generally follow specific language: the corporation is formed to conduct and transact all lawful business activities allowed under the laws of the state." 2 The goal of shareholder wealth maximization became de rigueur at all corporations."1 3
But there is a growing sense that corporations should have goals that
go beyond merely the creation of wealth for equity holders. Some scholars
propose refocusing the aims of the corporation largely within existing legal
structures. Ronald Colombo, for example, suggests that corporate directors
exercise their agency obligations on behalf of the shareholder owners in a
way consistent with an Aristotelian understanding of ownership-one that
takes account of the common good and, by implication, the interests of other stakeholders." 4 Other approaches involve the creation of new legal structures for the expression of these goals. One example is the growth of business organizations tailored to include socially beneficial purposes. Benefit
corporations are a form of business organization created by state statutes to
promote a more socially-responsible orientation within the business.1 5 The
" Sulkowsi & Greenfield, supra note 108, at 945 ("The incorporation statutes of forty-nine
states allow these states to dissolve a corporation or enjoin it from engaging in ultra vires activities that is, activities outside of the corporation's authority.").
"' See, e.g., Recent Cases, Corporations Ultra Vires: What Acts Are Ultra Vires IllDefined Objects of Incorporation, 32 HARV. L. REV. 285, 290 (1919) (discussing a corporate
purpose "enabling the company to carry on almost every conceivable kind of business which such
an organization could adopt").
12 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S.
Benefit Corporations,40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 618 (2017).
13 Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003,
2004 (2013) ("Many, and possibly most, public companies now embrace a shareholder-centered
vision of good corporate governance that emphasizes 'maximizing shareholder value' (typically
measured by share price) over all other corporate goals."); see also eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc.
v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) ("Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the
craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form.
Those standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.").
114 See Ronald J. Colombo, Ownership, Limited: Reconciling Traditional and Progressive
Corporate Law Via an Aristotelian Understandingof Ownership, 34 J. CORP. L. 247 (2008); see
also Susan J. Stabile, A Catholic Vision of the Corporation, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 181, 186

(2005) (arguing for a corporate purpose that takes account of human dignity as grounded in Catholic social thought). Without proposing any real changes in the legal regime, however, it's difficult
to see how these attitude changes would be accomplished.
115 See Matthew J. Dulac, Sustainingthe Sustainable Corporation:Benefit Corporationsand
the Viability of Going Public, 104 GEO. L.J. 171, 175 (2015) ("A benefit corporation is a for-profit
corporation with a stated public benefit that operates in a responsible and sustainable manner; in
other words, it pursues the dual mission of making a profit and achieving some social good.");
Brett McDonnell, Benefit Corporationsand Strategic Action Fields or (the ExistentialFailing of
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"

signal change from corporation to benefit corporation is its rejection of the
shareholder primacy norm for a more socially-beneficial corporate purpose.
This purpose must fit within the rubric of "social benefit" as defined by the
state statute. Although most states provide a relatively broad definition, "6
state benefit corporation law usually includes some mechanisms for enforcing the "benefit" component, such as benefit reporting, a benefit officer,
fiduciary duties related to the benefit, or ultra vires actions if the purpose is
ignored.1 7
Traditionally organized companies are also feeling pressure to adopt
purposes and principles beyond maximizing shareholder wealth. There is, of
course, the possibility that such efforts are primarily for public relations.
But there seems to be an increasing interest in authentic efforts to make a
business about more than simply making money. At companies that follow
participatory or self-managed internal governance, the purpose of the organization becomes the core around which the organization operates.1"9 Corporate social responsibility experts argue that the principles and purpose
Focusing on
should be baked into the corporation's everyday operations.
a purpose above and beyond shareholder wealth challenges the driving spirit of shareholder primacy.
2. Principal Costs & Shareholder Disengagement
Dual-class voting structures at such tech titans as Facebook and Google,
as well as the previously untested waters of nonvoting shares as distributed by
Snap Inc., have raised anew the wisdom of deviating from the traditional one-

Delaware), 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 263, 280 (2016) ("State statutes legally define benefit corporations. These statutes sit atop the basic business corporation statute. That is, benefit corporations
are business corporations, subject to all of the rules of the business corporation statute, except
insofar as the benefit corporation statute provides different or additional rules.").
116 Delaware defines public benefit as "a positive effect (or reduction of negative effects) on 1
or more categories of persons, entities, communities or interests (other than stockholders in their
capacities as stockholders) including, but not limited to, effects of an artistic, charitable, cultural,
economic, educational, environmental, literary, medical, religious, scientific or technological
nature." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(b).
117 Heminway, supra note 112, at
618.
118 See Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social
Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 983, 985 (2011)
(identifying the problem of "faux CSR").
119 See Matthew T. Bodie, Holacracy and the Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 619, 635
(2018).
10 V. Kasturi Rangan, Lisa Chase & Sohel Karim,
The Truth About CSR, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Jan.-Feb. 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/01/the-truth-about-csr [https://perna.cc/CVY2-9Y93] (contending that the main goal of CSR practices should be "to align a company's social and environmental activities with its business purpose and values").
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share, one-vote paradigm. 121 Traditionally, corporate governance advocates
have seen the one-share, one-vote paradigm as inviolate, and have pressured
companies to eschew dual-class or non-voting share structures. But there has
been a recent and somewhat surprising trend towards a theoretical justification for deviations from the one-share, one-vote scheme.
It is no accident that these arguments come at a time when investments
in massive, passive index funds is increasing apace. 122 Index funds exist
solely to own shares in an established set of financially successful companies while charging fees that are as low as possible. Any effort to investigate
the issues at play in any particular election, or-in extreme circumstancesto run and fund a proxy challenge to incumbent directors, will cost the
fund's participants while providing benefits to participants in the other index funds, who spend nothing. 12 3 Such activity will redound to the detriment of the particular fund, as all funds get the benefit but only the particular fund incurs the cost. 2 4 In a world where the index sets the investment
portfolio, funds compete on cost, and every extra analyst becomes an unnecessary luxury.
The extraordinary growth of index funds causes substantial problems
to a corporate governance model based on the shareholder franchise. Voting
rights require information to be meaningful. If a voter is not informed on
the choice at hand, the voter will not make a rational choice. Either the voter will still vote, introducing whimsy and capriciousness into the process, or
the voter will abstain. Neither option is effective if the system is built on
informed choice and the resulting market discipline.
In response to these funds with large masses of insensate stock holdings,
corporate law scholars have pushed back against the assumptions of the traditional law and economic model. In developing their theory of "principal
costs," Zohar Goshen and Richard Squire argue that the field has been too
focused on agency costs-namely, the inefficiencies generated by the delegation of control from shareholders to directors and managers. 2 5 They point out
that shareholder governance decisions can lead to "competence costs," arising
from lack of information or talent, and "conflict costs," relating to the conflicts between different goals within the shareholder group.1 26 Shareholders
121 Steven Davidoff Solomon, Snap'sPlan Is Most Unfriendly
to Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/snap-ipo-plan-evan-spiegel.
html [https://penna.cc/DNY5-XL57].
12 Lund, supra note 6, at 494.
23
Id. at 495.
124

Id.
125 Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 769 (using the term "agency-cost essentialists" for

scholars
who "treat the reduction of agency costs as the essential function of corporate law").
12 6
Id. at 770-71.
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delegate their governance authority to management in order to address these
costs. 127 In particular, shareholder competence costs grow as shareholders
become less knowledgeable about the corporation and its leadership. The
problem of ignorant equity holders is so severe in Dorothy Lund's view that
she argues for regulatory restrictions on voting rights for large, passive
funds.1 28 Excluding their shares from the voting pool will give a larger role to
more informed and deserving shareholders.1 29 If voting rights are useless or
restricted, then shareholders may begin to question their value. Nonvoting
shares-an unspeakable taboo for modern corporate law-may actually be a
better deal if shareholders do not have the information sufficient to translate
their preferences into voting choices. 130
These new approaches deeply unsettle shared premises of modern corporate law theory. And they do so working within the shared normative
framework of shareholder primacy. One might expect that at least some
scholars would have proposed even more radical deviations from settled
corporate law doctrine. Alas, thus far, that has not been the case.
D. The Stakeholder Alternative
In contrast to shareholder primacy, the stakeholder model of the corporation, also called the communitarian or multifiduciary model, 131 proposes
that corporate governance should take all stakeholders in the corporate enterprise into account, rather than limiting governance power to shareholders.132 As an oppositional theory, stakeholder theory has largely served to
act as a rhetorical brake on some of the excesses of shareholder primacy.133
But it often ends up reinforcing the status quo. If anything, stakeholder the127 Id. at 771 ("[P]rincipal costs are more fundamental than agent costs,
as the goal of reducing them is the reason that investors delegate control to managers .... ").
128 Lund, supra note 6, at 497.
129

Id.

13

Lund, supra note 8, at 745.
&

31 See Simone M. Sepe, Directors'Duty to Creditors and the Debt Contract, 1 J. BUS.

TECH. L. 553, 561 (2007) (noting that "communitarians .... advocate a multifiduciary model
where all corporate stakeholders benefit from the attribution of directors' fiduciary duties"); see
also David Millon, Communitarianismin CorporateLaw: Foundationsand Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 11-12 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (discussing
the use of the multifiduciary model by communitarian corporate law scholars).
132 See Millon, supra note 131, at 11-12 (discussing efforts to provide protections to nonshareholder constituencies); Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 293-94 (arguing that directors owe a
duty to the corporation and that the corporation consists of all of the stakeholders who are responsible for the business of the enterprise).
133 For a discussion of those excesses, see Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the
False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 975 (2006); William W. Bratton, Enron and
the Dark Side of ShareholderValue, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1275 (2002).
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ory expands upon the discretion provided to the board and the boardselected management to follow their own judgment in contravention of the
will of the shareholders.
The most tangible contribution of stakeholder theory to corporate law
has been the constituency statute, the law in a majority of states (but not
Delaware). 134 The constituency statute provides directors with the discretion
to take the interests of all stakeholders into account when making certain
types of decisions.13 5 Directors need not take other interests into account,
and there is generally no remedy for other stakeholders. These statutes are
just a way of insulating directors from claims that they failed to do enough
for shareholders when contemplating a tender offer, merger, or factory shutdown.
The real problem with stakeholder theory is that it is not, at least at present, a real theory of corporate governance. Stakeholder theory lacks a model
for allocating governance rights and responsibilities among the participants.1 36 The theory is more in tune with the nexus of contracts approach, as it
treats all the participants in the firm as deserving of governance consideration. But it fails to develop a system for managing the different stakeholders
within the firm. Stakeholder theory does not, for example, argue that corporations are simply contractual nexuses and thus should not exist as legal entities.1 37 Nor, more surprisingly, have stakeholder theorists sketched out a system whereby all stakeholders can participate in firm governance. Instead,
stakeholder theorists have largely glommed on to the existing structure of
corporate law, where shareholders elect directors who appoint officers.131

134 Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competitionfor
Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 215 tbl.1 (2006) (finding that thirty-one states have
constituency statutes).
135 Some are limited to takeover/mergers, while others apply to all decisions. Millon, supra
note 131, at 11-12.
136 See Joseph Heath, Business Ethics Without Stakeholders, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 533, 543
(2006) (arguing that stakeholder theory creates "extraordinary agency risks" because of the potential for conflicts); Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, Puttinga Stake in Stakeholder Theory, 88 J. BUS.
ETHICS 605, 611 (2009) (arguing that stakeholder theory fails to provide a system of mechanisms
for governance, other than "balancing" stakeholder concerns).
13' Instead, many stakeholder theorists also ascribe to the entity view of the corporation,
which argues for treating the corporation as a state-created separate entity. Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm From Nature to Function, 118 PENN ST. L. REv. 1, 24
(2013) ("CSR scholars and stakeholder theorists have justified consideration of broader stakeholder interests by characterizing the firm 'as not merely a legal fiction but rather as a moral organism
with social and ethical responsibilities,' or built upon the view of the corporation as 'an entity
existing in time' and as a 'distinct person."' (citations omitted)).
13 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 63, at 2113 (discussing examples); cf
Emily Winston,
ManagerialFixation and the Limitations of Shareholder Oversight, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 699 (2020)
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II. THE FIRM AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES

If we are to move beyond the current shareholder primacy model of corporate governance, we need a theory of governance to ground our new conception of the corporation. Economic theory is based, broadly, on the principle of efficiency. The "theory of the firm" is a subdiscipline of economics that
focuses particularly on issues of organization and governance.1 39 The literature on the theory of the firm asks: why do we have firms, rather than markets? 140 This literature offers a sustained interdisciplinary inquiry into the
nature of firms and their legal representations.141 While much of the current
work in other social sciences, such as psychology and sociology, dovetails
with economic theory and provides additional insights into the basic economic models,1 42 the theory of the firm offers a starting point for these inquiries
and a basis upon which to build an alternative academic narrative.
A. Applying the Theory of the Firm to CorporateGovernance
Research into the theory of the firm seeks to answer a fundamental
question: Why do we even have firms at all? Markets allocate resources
based on the best information available at the time.1 43 Firms, however, operate outside of this market structure, standing like "lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk." 144 The law reflects this differentiation, as
market transactions are generally governed by contract, while firms are created as specific legal entities with their own identity-partnerships, corporations, and limited liability companies (LLCs), among others. Firms are
meant to operate outside the market. But why?
In early neoclassical economics, the theory of the firm was quite rudimentary; the firm was simply a black box that took in inputs and produced
(arguing for a reduction of shareholder governance power through stakeholder reporting and
stakeholder-focused managerial compensation).
139 ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM, at ix (2013).
140 Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1757, 1757-65 (1989) (discussing various theories of the firm).
141 ORTS, supra note 139; Scott E. Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
181 (1988).
142 See Matthew T. Bodie, The Post-RevolutionaryPeriod in Corporate Law: Returning to the
Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1033, 1057 (2012) (noting that "the different social science disciplines-economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology are increasingly borrowing
from one another and bleeding into each other's work"); see also THE FIRM AS A COLLABORATIVE
COMMUNITY: RECONSTRUCTING TRUST IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (Charles Heckscher & Paul

S. Adler eds., 2006) [hereinafter COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY] (taking an organizational behavior
approach).
143 F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 520 (1945).
144 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937) (quoting D.H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 (1930)).
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outputs.1 4 5 No further dissection was undertaken. The black box, however,
did differentiate between what was inside the firm and what was outside:
employees and capital assets were inside, while customers and suppliers
were outside.1 46 Despite its crude form, this conception of the firm was useful in early economic modeling and retains that purpose even today.
An exploration of the internal workings and purpose of the firm begins
with the work of Ronald Coase.1 47 In an oft-quoted passage from his concise masterpiece, The Nature of the Firm, Coase considered the firm-market
distinction:
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market.
Within a firm, these market transactions are eliminated and in
place of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs
production. It is clear that these are alternative methods of coordinating production. Yet, having regard to the fact that if production is regulated by price movements, production could be
carried on without any organisation at all, well might we ask, why
is there any organisation? 41
In answering this question, Coase turned to a theory of transaction costs.
Contracting through markets and using the price mechanism can be costly.
For certain transactions, Coase posited, it is cheaper to simply direct the
production to occur rather than contracting for it each time. The hierarchy
of the firm allows such transactions to be carried out by fiat, rather than
through pricing, negotiating, and drafting a contract for each transaction.1 49
In other words, hierarchical governance within the firm was more efficient
than market transactions.
Coase's theory of the firm relies heavily on the idea of the employment
relationship. The structural differentiation between firm and market is the
relationship between individual employees and the firm's ownership or
management. The employment relationship is not based on individual spot
transactions, but rather an ongoing organizational relationship. As Coase

145 Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1462
(2005) ("The predominant model of microeconomics, neoclassical price theory, assumes simply that the firm is a
black box that maximizes profitability.").
146 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and
the Self-governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1631 (2001).
147 Coase, supra note
144.
14
1 d. at 388.
14 9
Id. at 390-92.
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famously noted: "If a workman moves from department Y to department X,
he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he was
ordered to do so."" The relationship between the firm and the employee is
the primary distinction between the firm and the market. It is the reason for
the firm's existence.
Coase cemented this conclusion when he considered "whether the concept of a firm which has been developed fits in with that existing in the real
world."15 1His answer? "We can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in practice by considering the legal relationship normally called
that of 'master and servant' or 'employer and employee." 5 2 He then quoted at length from a treatise concerning the common law "control" test,
which provides that "[t]he master must have the right to control the servant's work, either personally or by another servant or agent."1 53 He concluded: "We thus see that it is the fact of direction which is the essence of
the legal concept of 'employer and employee,' just as it was in the economic concept which was developed above." 154 For Coase, the employeremployee relationship defined the firm. 5
Coase saw the nature of the firm as a hierarchical one in which managers controlled the efforts of employees. But the relationship between firm
and employee need not be hierarchical. In an important response to Coase's
work, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz also focused on the relationship
of employees with other participants within the structure of the firm.1 56 Alchian and Demsetz argued that Coase's focus on control, authority, and direction was misleading. 17 They put it this way, memorably: "Telling an
employee to type this letter rather than to file that document is like my telling a grocer to sell me this brand of tuna rather than that brand of bread." 58
Because employees are generally hired and fired at will, neither the em-

15

1 Id. at 387.
Id. at 403.

151
152

Id.

153

Id. at 404 (citation omitted).
&

154 Id.
155 See Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L.

POL'Y REV. 265, 296-97 (1998).
156 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777, 777 (1972) ("When a lumber mill employs a cabinetmaker, cooperation between specialists is achieved within a firm, and when a cabinetmaker purchases
wood from a lumberman, the cooperation takes place across markets (or between firms).").
157 Id. ("To speak of managing, directing, or assigning workers to various tasks is a deceptive
way of noting that the employer continually is involved in renegotiation of contracts on terms that
must be acceptable to both parties.").
158 Id.
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ployer nor the employee is bound to continue the relationship by any contractual obligations.1 59
Alchian and Demsetz instead took a more holistic approach, focusing
on the firm's role in coordinating production in the midst of a variety of
inputs. Team production is what separated firms from markets. Alchian and
Demsetz defined team production as "production in which 1) several types
of resources are used and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of
each cooperating resource."160 As a result, team production applies when
the coordinated effort increased productivity, after factoring out the costs
associated with monitoring and disciplining the team.161
The lack of "separable outputs" is the key problem that the firm is designed to manage. When capital providers and workers join together to carry on a business, it is difficult to assess the relative importance or value of
the individual contributions to that business in an easily measurable and
ongoing formula. Firms allow these contributors to work together, sell their
joint product, and then use the firm to manage both responsibilities and
spoils. Alchian and Demsetz argued that a specialized, independent monitor
was likely the best way of manage these issues.1 62 That central monitorthe recipient of the residual profits-would be the firm itself: a legal "person" who contracts for all other team inputs.1 63 The legal entity-such as
the corporation-serves the role of coordinator.
The Alchian and Demsetz joint-production model includes employees
as well as investors within the definition of the firm. The purpose of the Alchian-Demsetz firm is to manage labor and capital through the coordination
of team production. Although outside shareholders contribute capital, they
are relegated to the outer circles of power, as Alchian and Demsetz express
skepticism about their ability to perform the monitoring function. Alchian
and Demsetz ask:
In sum, is it the case that the stockholder-investor relationship is
one emanating from the division of ownership among several
159 Id. ("Long-term contracts between employer and employee are not the essence
of the orcall
a
firm.").
we
ganization
160
Id. at 779.
161
Id. at 780.
162 Id. at 782-83.
163 Alchian and Demsetz set forth the following characteristics
of the firm:

(a) joint input production, (b) several input owners, (c) one party who is common to
all the contracts of the joint inputs, (d) who has the rights to renegotiate any input's
contract independently of contracts with the other input owners, (e) who holds the
residual claim, and (f) who has the right to sell his central contractual residual status.
Id. at 783.
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people, or is it that the collection of investment funds from people
of various anticipations is the underlying factor? If the latter, why
should any of them be thought of as the owners in whom voting
rights, whatever they may signify or however exercisable, should
reside in order to enhance efficiency? Why voting rights in any of
the outside, participating investors? 6 4
As the theory of the firm literature continued to develop, the critical
question remained why some economic activities take place in markets and
others take place within firms. The transaction-costs model identifies the
types of contractual difficulties which are likely to lead to firm governance
rather than market solutions.1 65 In situations where contributions and compensation can be harder to define, the parties will be left with incomplete
contracts that require a governance structure to prevent opportunism. 166
This opportunism will be particularly problematic where one or both of the
parties must invest significant resources in assets specific to the particular
firm, project, or transaction.1 67 This asset specificity makes the parties susceptible to hold-ups from their contractual partners in the absence of a system of governance. Firms can be useful in providing the structures that deter opportunism.168
The "property rights" theory of the firm, developed in a series of articles by Sanford Grossman, Oliver Hart, and John Moore, argues that firms
are necessary as a repository of property rights for assets used in joint production.1 69 By owning the property outright, the firm prevents the problem
164

Id. at 789 n.14.
Jeffrey T. Macher & Barak D. Richman, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of
EmpiricalResearch in the Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1 (2008) (discussing transaction costs
165

approach). See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985).
166 Oliver E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization?, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 369, 373 (2005) ("Governance problems are posed when incomplete contracts (to include
unforeseen contingencies) are combined with opportunism.").
167 George S. Geis, The Space Between Markets and Hierarchies,95 VA. L. REV. 99, 107-08
n.28 (2009) ("Oliver Williamson has significantly expanded upon Coase's initial insight by discussing the importance of bundling relationship-specific assets into a firm to avoid counterparty
opportunism, and, more generally, by showing how a proper conception of transaction costs
should include both the direct costs of managing relationships and the opportunity costs of suboptimal governance decisions.").

168 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 165, at 114-15; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 47-48 (1996).
169 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and LateralIntegration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore,

Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Oliver Hart & John

Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990). See generally
OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995).
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of the commons (in which no one holds property rights over valuable assets) as well as the problem of the anticommons (in which property rights
are divvied up among too many disparate actors). The Grossman-HartMoore model dictates that those who contribute the most valuable and most
asset-specific property to the joint enterprise should control the firm. 17O
They are not only most necessary to the firm's success, but also the most
vulnerable to hold-up problems as the joint enterprise moves forward in
time.

The "access" model "define[s] a firm both in terms of unique assets
(which may be physical or human) and in terms of the people who have
access to these assets." 7 1 Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales define access
as "the ability to use, or work with, a critical resource." 7 2 As Rajan and
Zingales make clear, "[t]he agent who is given privileged access to the resource gets no new residual rights of control. All she gets is the opportunity
to specialize her human capital to the resource and make herself valuable." 7 3 Combined with her right to leave the firm, access gives the employee "the ability to create a critical resource that she controls: her specialized
human capital. Control over this critical resource is a source of power
... .""4 Gordon Smith has further developed this "critical resource" theory
of the firm in outlining a theory of fiduciary duties that are responsible to
vulnerabilities created by critical resources. 7 5
Employees' contributions to the firm-often described as "human
capital"-can be characterized as assets of both the firm and the employee.
Some types of human capital are portable, such as education or general
skills, but other types are specific to the firm and cannot be taken by the
employee elsewhere. To the extent an employee has invested in firmspecific human capital, she is subject to opportunistic behavior because she
cannot plausibly threaten to use that capital at a rival firm. One aspect of
this capital-knowledge-has served as the basis for a new set of ap-

170 D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV.
1399, 1404-05 (2002) ("The central insight of the property rights theory of the firm is that an
appropriate allocation of ownership rights over the assets of a firm reduces the likelihood that one
party will unfairly take advantage of the other participants within the firm.").
171 Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON.
387, 390 (1998).
172
Id. at 388.
173 Id.
174

Id.

Smith, supra note 170, at 1404 ("[T]the critical resource theory reveals that the beneficiary's vulnerability emanates from an inability to protect against opportunism by the fiduciary
with respect to the critical resource.").
175
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'

proaches to the firm.1 76 Knowledge-based theories focus on the need to produce, distribute, and ultimately retain valuable knowledge-based assets
within the firm. 7 Choices between centralized and multi-divisional organizational structures,171 or between covenants not to compete and employee
stock options,1 79 are made to manage the control of knowledge within the
firm. Along the same lines, a capability-based theory of the firm focuses on
employees' firm-specific knowledge and learning that can be translated into
joint production. 180 Another perspective on the firm, this time from organizational theory, sees the firm as a "collaborative community" in which employees work together toward common goals.' 8
Looking over the trajectory of the theory of the firm, we see that the
primary concern has been over the shape and internal organization for these
entities that operate outside of the standard market relationships. And the
theories of the firm all seem to acknowledge the important role of workers
within the firm. Going back to Coase, the firm was designed to manage the
relationship between those who started or managed the business and those
who worked for the business. The work of the business was best managed
internally, rather than through external markets. And the firm itself was
made up of those who worked for the firm, along with those who "managed" the firm-also workers-and those who "owned" the firm through
financial assets.
B. The Legal Construction of Firm Governance
Because the firm is the primary organizational engine of economic activity and growth, the internal governance of the firm takes on supreme importance. The corporate form, and its systematic exclusion of employees
from governance, is not endemic to economic organization. Partnerships,
for example, were the original legal structure for organizing a group of peo176

See Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions, and Firm

Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123 (2007); see
also Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership ofHuman Capital

in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721 (2002) (discussing legal conceptions that govern the ownership of human capital within the workplace).
17 Gorga & Michael Halberstam, supra note 176, at 1137 (criticizing the property rights
theory17 8for failing to account for the importance of employees as assets).
1

d. at 1173-83.

Id. at 1183-92; cf Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of
Technology-Intensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1686-88 (2009) (discussing the role of
covenants not to compete in managing innovation within the firm).
80 Thomas F. McInerney, Implications of High Performance Production and Work Practices
179

for Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 135, 139.
18

See Paul S. Adler & Charles Heckscher, Towards Collaborative Community, in COLLAB-

ORATIVE COMMUNITY, supra note 142, at 11, 13.
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ple into a firm. Unlike corporations, partnerships have never required an
explicit grant of authority from the government to operate. 8 2 In fact, courts
can determine that a group of people had been operating as a partnership
even if they had never declared themselves to be partners or considered
themselves to be within a partnership. 83 Instead, the test is whether the parties had formed an "association of two or more persons to carry on as coowners a business for profit." 8 4 There are numerous examples where people working together on the assumption that the worker was an employee
turned out to be partners under the law.1 85
Under the default rules of a partnership, all participants have equal
voting rights and equal rights to vote on partnership matters.1 86 The control
rights in a partnership extend even to ordinary, everyday matters of the
business.1 87 Of course, "one partner, one vote" is only the default rule. Partners who contemplate varying levels of input and interest will generally
construct a partnership agreement that allocates votes as well as shares of
the residual profits according to mutual agreement. 88 Partners are free to
divvy up voting power according to contributions, seniority, experience,
involvement, and other factors relevant to governance. The default rules are
a bit more structured for the limited partnership, the limited liability partnership, and the LLC. These organizations envision participants with stakes
in the residual who do not participate in management. For example, limited
partnerships must make clear who the managerial partners are, and who the
limited partners are.1 89 LLCs have what is known as "chameleon" manage182

See D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 34 (2004)

("[N]o formalities are required to form a partnership."); Christine Hurt, PartnershipLost, 53 U.
RICH. L. REv. 491, 497 (2019) ("Partnerships existed at common law in England and in the United
States before partnership acts were promulgated in the 1800s.").
18 See, e.g., Bass v. Bass, 814 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tenn. 1991) (holding that "it is not essential
that the parties actually intend to become partners").
184 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT

§ 202(a)

(NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS

2013).
185 See, e.g., Holmes v. Lerner, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130, 132 (Ct. App. 1999); Smith v. Redd, 593
So. 2d 989, 991 (Miss. 1991); Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 891 (Tex. 2009).
186 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 401(h).

187 See

id.

188 See, e.g., Day v. Sidley & Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986, 992 (D.D.C. 1975) (discussing how

"statutory rules governing the rights and duties of the partners are 'subject to any agreement between them"' (citation omitted)).
189

See UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT

§ 303

(NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE

LAWS 2013) (providing that "[a] debt, obligation, or other liability of a limited partnership is not
the debt, obligation, or other liability of a limited partner"). Under the original Uniform Limited
Partnership Act, however, limited partners may be subject to liability as managing partners if they
participate in the governance. UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 7 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS 1916) ("A limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless
. . he takes part in the control of the business.").
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ment: "the firm can choose either direct partnership-type control by the
members or centralized control by managers that is closer to, but not as rigid as, the limited partnership format." 9 0 Participants in these enterprises
have substantial flexibility in arranging the division of ownership and control rights.
The corporation, in contrast, represents a shareholder-oriented governance structure-one that leaves out other participants. In smaller corporations known as closely held corporations, the same basic corporate structure
is used, but these businesses must adapt the corporate form's rigidity for
their purposes. 191 Many closely held companies have different classes of
shares as a method of allocating control among different groups of shareholders.1 92 In addition, shareholders may agree to certain voting arrangements, such as the pooling of votes into a voting trust or an agreement to
vote together.1 93 These voting arrangements consolidate a group of disparate
shareholders into a majority and provide protection to minority shareholders
over certain critical matters. 194 Corporate law can also protect minority
shareholders against undue oppression through specifically tailored equitable relief. Such oppression often relates to the ability of minority shareholders to partake in other aspects of the corporate pie-specifically, employment.1 95 Even if shareholders are all sharing equally in the profits, the minority oppression doctrine may still order the majority shareholders to approve a dividend or to provide employment opportunities within the company for minority shareholders.1 96
Larry E. Ribstein, The Evolving Partnership,26 J. CORP. L. 819, 843 (2001).
See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass.
1975) (defining closely held corporations as having: "(1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no
ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the
management, direction and operations of the corporation").
190
191

192

Preferred stock is particularly common in start-up corporations. Venture capital investors

prefer to invest with preferred stock, which converts into common stock with multiple voting
shares if certain triggers are reached. William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REv. 891, 892 (2002) (noting that "[c]onvertible preferred stock is the dominant financial contract in the venture capital market").
193 See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 486-96 (2000).
194 Perhaps the most famous example of such a trust involves the Ringling
family of circus
fame. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441, 447
(Del. 1947) (upholding such a trust).
195 See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 664 (Mass.
1976)
(finding "no legitimate business purpose" to the majority shareholders' decision to suspend a
minority shareholder's salary, fail to reelect him as a director, and fail to appoint him as an officer); Leslie v. Bos. Software Collaborative, Inc., 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 379 (Super. Ct. 2002) (minority shareholder terminated from his position as treasurerby majority shareholders).
196 For a further discussion of the protection of minority shareholders vis-a-vis the protection
of political minorities, see Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE
L.J. 119 (2003).
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This divergence between the cookie-cutter structure of corporation governance and the more tailored approaches of other systems suggests that corporations could reconsider their lockstep approach. And in fact, recent developments in shareholding structures illustrate a breakdown in the one-share,
one-vote consensus model. Companies such as Facebook, Google, and Snap
have stock structures that grant the company founders special control rights
beyond their common stock holdings.1 97 Preferred stock is also used to provide control rights in certain circumstances, such as the failure to make a
payment or the approach of the company's dissolution.1 98 Companies are
getting creative in order to accommodate the special circumstances of their
particular business firm.1 99
More broadly, corporate law needs to dig deeper into the theory of the
firm. It needs to reexamine the premise that corporate governance is only
about shareholders, directors, and officers. In particular, corporate law policymakers and theorists need to look at all of the corporation's stakeholders
and determine if governance rights are appropriate as a way of managing
their preferences. Prior to recent proposed legislation, 200 the U.S. corporate
law community has not seriously entertained any significant changes to the
corporate franchise. Even team-production proponents have only prodded
the board of directors to consider the interests of stakeholders. 201 With the
power structures already in place, it makes little sense to imagine a stakeholder-rights theory without any positive governance power for stakeholders. As former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine has emphasized:
Under the DGCL [Delaware General Corporate Law] only stockholders have the right to vote for directors; approve certificate
amendments; amend the bylaws; approve certain other transactions, such as mergers, and certain asset sales and leases; and en197

Lund, supra note 8, at 694.

198 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW & ECONOMICS 66-67 (2002) ("[P]referred

stock may have a preference over common stock with respect to dividends and/or liquidation.").
Preferred shares have often been ignored in the debate about shareholder wealth maximization,
with the assumption that the shareholders in question are the common stockholders. See id at 66
(noting that preferred stock is "an odd beast, neither wholly fish nor wholly fowl"); William W.
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815, 1820
(2013) ("Preferred stock sits on a fault line between two great private law paradigms, corporate
law and contract law. It is neither one nor the other; rather, it draws on both.").
199 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 773 ("[B]ecause the impact of a given governance
structure on control costs is firm-specific, there is no particular governance structure that can be
described as intrinsically good, bad, welfare enhancing, or inefficient.").
200 See, e.g., Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); Reward Work Act, S.
2605, 115th Cong. (2018).
201 Hayden & Bodie, supra note
63.
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force the DGCL's terms and hold directors accountable for honoring their fiduciary duties. In the corporate republic, no constituency other than stockholders is given any power. 202
Voting rights are the only way to provide a real voice to preferences within
the corporation's governance structure. 2 03
C. A Shared GovernanceModel of the Firm
1. Participation in Joint Production
Corporations exist to facilitate economic production. 204 The corporate
form is not the same thing as a business; an actual business consists of ideas, relationships, economic activity, and legal rights. The corporate form is
part of this mix. 205 The corporation is a legal fiction that creates rights and
duties; the business firm is the ongoing social phenomenon that is the business. The legal part of the business equation is meant to facilitate the social
and economic phenomenon.
The economic distribution of the responsibilities for production, as
well as the distribution of the fruits of production, will ultimately rest in the
hands of those with organizational power. Much of the debate in corporate
law over the last forty years-perhaps even the last century-has concerned
the distribution of corporate power between the board, the officers, and the
shareholders. 206 Shareholder advocates have pushed for corporate law re-

202 Leo E. Strine,

Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understandingof

the Power andAccountability Structure Establishedby the Delaware General CorporationLaw,

50 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 761, 763-66 (2015); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our ContinuingStruggle with the Idea That For-Profit CorporationsSeek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 13536 (2012) ("[T]he continued failure of our societies to be clear-eyed about the role of the for-profit
corporation endangers the public interest.").
203 Smith, supra note 170, at 1458 (contemplating "that the key residual ownership right in
the corporation is the right to elect directors").
204 RIBSTEm, supra note 68, at 4 ("The corporation undeniably has driven business growth in
the United States since the Industrial Revolution.").
205 William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization:BargainingUnder Constraints, 91
YALE L.J. 1521, 1521 (1982) (arguing that "the most useful way to analyze the modern business
enterprise is to interpret the terms of the economic arrangements of a firm (partnership, corporation, cooperative) and the terms of the related economic arrangements that should not be analyzed
separately from the firm (distributorship, loan agreement, employment contracts) as a series of
bargains subject to constraints and made in contemplation of a long-term relationship").
206 For the beginnings of the debate over the separation of ownership and control, see ADOLF
A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

(1932). See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 67, at 309-28 (discussing the problem of agency costs
in light of the separation of ownership and control).
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forms that provide more direct power to stockholders. 207 Management and
stakeholder advocates have argued that boards need more insulation from
shareholders and less scrutiny, even if their ultimate aims remain shareholder wealth maximization. 208 In this second group, there is a subset of advocates who argue that stakeholders such as employees, creditors, consumers,
and communities deserve some protection within the process. 209 But stakeholder supporters generally provide directors with the freedom to merely
consider all stakeholder interests, rather than granting voting power to these
stakeholders. 210
If the firm is designed to help manage a system of joint production,
then the governance of the firm should include those who participate in the
joint production. The distinction between markets and firms is this distinction between the use of straightforward contracts to manage relationships
and the need for governance mechanisms to manage relationships. 21' Firms
involve the complexities of ongoing joint production between participants
who cannot reduce their interactions simply to contractual performance
metrics. Instead, the participants create another entity-the firm-to serve
as the locus of their production and to structure both the inputs required by
the participants and to divvy up the outputs among them.
Shareholders and employees are invested in the firm in such a way that
they need firm governance to protect against opportunism. When it comes to
their contractual vulnerability, shareholders are indeed situated differently from
other capital providers (such as creditors). 2 2 Shareholders invest their money
into the firm with no ability to withdraw it and subject to uncertain payoffs,
largely at the discretion of management. 213 Employees are also firm investors.
207 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 3 (arguing that shareholders should have more power in
corporate governance decision-making).
208 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 550; Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many
Myths ofLucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733, 754 (2007); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits
of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 804-05 (2007).
209 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 313.
21 Hayden & Bodie, supra note 63, at 2113 (discussing the "strange turn" against
stakeholder
board representation).
21 See Bengt Holmstrom, The Firm as a Subeconomy, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 74, 80 (1999)
("When contracts are incomplete in the sense that they cannot incorporate all future contracting
opportunities, governance becomes consequential.").
21 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 68-69; Benjamin Means, A ContractualApproach to ShareholderOppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161, 1197 (2010) (discussing
the problem of "shareholder oppression" and vulnerability, and the inability of contracts to unequivocally protect such shareholders).
21 See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What CorporateLaw Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 392 (2003) (citing the importance
of "resource commitment" or capital lock-in as a critical reason for the success of the corporation
as a private enterprise).
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They have invested their labor, reputations, and firm-specific individual capital
in the firm and cannot not pull these investments out.2 14 Under the law, they are
compensated on a more regular basis, and with less discretion, than shareholders.21 5 However, they still operate within the firm, as opposed to suppliers and
outside contractors who provide their services through markets. 216
Fig. 1
***

Inside Firm

Labor

Employees, Management

Capital

Shareholders

Outside Firm

Independent Contractors,
Suplier
Suppliers

Creditors

The theory of the firm supports a governance model that includes employees. Theory of the firm scholars have long appreciated the importance
of the employee to our conception of the firm.217 Ronald Coase looked to
the relationship between employer and employee to demonstrate empirical

214 See Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 302
(1998) (noting that firm-specific "skills make a worker more valuable to her present employer, but
also make her more vulnerable to a firm's opportunistic behavior"); Andrew Keay, Stakeholder
Theory in Corporate Law: Has It Got What It Takes?, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 249, 268
(2010).
21 As late as the nineteenth century, employees worked for terms as long as a year and were
not entitled to any contractual payment if they left before the end. See, e.g., Stark v. Parker, 19
Mass. (2. Pick.) 267, 292-94 (1824) (denying any contractual recovery for an employee who left
after nine months of a twelve-month job); Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481, 491-92 (1834) (denying
contractual recovery but allowing for recovery under restitution). Now, however, wage and hour
laws require payment for time worked and periodic payments made to the employee. See generally Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2018)) (mandating that employees receive pay for their hours worked).
216 Scholars have made a case for consumer governance rights in a limited set of circumstances. See HANSMANN, supra note 93, at 149-223 (discussing specific instances of customer-owned
enterprises); David G. Yosifon, Consumer Lock-in and the Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1429, 1430 (2012) [hereinafter Yosifon, Lock-in] (arguing that "a departure from the shareholder wealth maximization norm and an embrace of a multi-stakeholder corporate governance
regime may be necessary to overcome agency problems associated with consumer lock-in"); David G. Yosifon, The ConsumerInterest in CorporateLaw, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 253, 302 (2009)
[hereinafter Yosifon, Consumer Interest] (arguing that consumers are inadequately represented in
corporate governance).
217 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 144, at 401-05 (incorporating the employer-employee relationship in constructing the concept of a firm).
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support for his theory of the firm. 218 Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz
argued that the importance of the firm (as separate from the market) stems
from the need to coordinate production from a variety of inputs. 219 Team
production applies-and firms replace markets-when the coordinated effort increases productivity, after factoring out the costs associated with
monitoring and disciplining the team. 220 Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout relied on this notion of team production in developing their stakeholder-based
theory.2 2
By adding employees to the governance mix, we are not opening it up
to all stakeholders. The non-separable inputs within team production really
belong to employees and shareholders. 222 Shareholders provide capital that
is taken within the firm and turned into discretionary funds. 223 Employees
work together under the aegis of the firm to produce goods or services in a
manner that generally cannot be separated out to assign specific values.224
Other participants are not integrated into the team production process, and,
thus, do not need to work within the firm.225 Creditors provide money on
fixed terms. 22 6 Suppliers and independent contractors provide specific services outside of the firm's scope. Consumers purchase the goods or services
after the production process is complete.227 And the surrounding community
regulates the firm as it does all other individuals and organizations within
21 See id. at 403 ("We can best approach the question of what constitutes
a firm in practice
by considering the legal relationship normally called that of 'master and servant' or 'employer and
employee."').
219 See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 156, at 778 (describing the firm as a "centralized contractual agent in a team productive process" (emphasis omitted)).
220
Id. at 780.
221 See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 275-76 (analyzing the "team production problem"
arising when "a number of individuals come together to undertake a team production project that
requires all to make some form of enterprise-specific investment" that "leave them vulnerable to
opportunistic exploitation by other team members").
222 See id at 249 ("If the team members' investments are firm-specific . .
and if output from
the enterprise is nonseparable . . . serious problems can arise in determining how any economic
surpluses generated by team production . . should be divided.").
223 See id. at 277 ("Providers of financial capital shareholders and even, potentially, some
creditors are, by this agreement, just as 'stuck' in the firm as are providers of specialized human
capital.").
224
Id. at 261.
225 See id at 269 (arguing that "shareholders, executives, and employees" are the main players on the "corporate 'team"').

226 But cf Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of CorporateLaw: A CriticalAssess-

ment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1652-55 (2002) (arguing that "[t]here is no doubt that creditors who loan money to publicly held corporations thereby make a team-specific investment" but
that they are "less vulnerable to opportunism when trading with publicly held corporations" when
compared to other team members).
227 See Yosifon, Consumer Interest, supra note 216, at 259 (discussing the cabined role of
some consumers in the transacting process).
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its jurisdiction. If we say that all of these participants engage in the team
production process, it proves too much-then all participants in the market
would be engaged in commerce with one another. Employees and shareholders are part of that team production process in a way that stakeholders
outside the firm are not. 228
Concern for the fates of other stakeholders is understandable and may, in
some circumstances, warrant a species of governance protection. Creditors,
for example, may receive specific protections when the company is close to
bankruptcy as a way of mitigating their particular vulnerabilities in such situations.229 Certain consumers may have the type of long-term, invested interests, such that some governance and/or ownership rights may make
sense. 230 In the main, however, government regulation will be the most
straightforward way of managing issues that arise and are not amenable to
contractual resolution. Creditors have statutory rights within bankruptcy. 23
Consumer protection laws can place mandatory terms or disclosure re-

228

Some stakeholder theorists have advocated specifically for employee governance rights.

GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 149 (advocating for a special role for employees in corporate law,
including the possibility of board representation); Brett H. McDonnell, Strategiesfor an Employee
Role in Corporate Governance, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 429, 429-31 (2011) (assessing "a
number of possible strategies for creating a role for employees in corporate governance"); see also
Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 334 (2008) (promoting employee primacy); Marleen O'Connor, Labor's Role in the American Corporate Governance Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 97,
98-99 (2000); Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation'sNexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1189, 1189 (1991).
Others have noted that employees have a stronger or the strongest case among stakeholders for
participation in governance. Millon, supra note 131, at 19 (noting that "[t]he most compelling
theoretical arguments for nonshareholder protection have focused on employees," and that the
"relative inadequacy of bargaining power and other disadvantages may more seriously impede
bargained-for protection for employees than for other nonshareholder groups").
229 See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means to an End, 38
SEATTLE U. L. REv. 255, 296 (2015) ("[C]ourts should revert to their traditional focus on policing
against the bargaining failures that can occur when investors use directors to address the incomplete contracting challenges that are replete in corporate finance."); Frederick Tung, Leverage in
the BoardRoom: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA

L. REv. 115, 119 (2009) (arguing that "bank creditors and other private lenders often enjoy significant oversight and influence over managerial decisions"). For a discussion of the possible expansion of fiduciary duties to creditors, see Frederick Tung, The New Death of Contract: Creeping
Corporate FiduciaryDutiesfor Creditors, 57 EMORY L.J. 809, 814-15 (2008) [hereinafter Tung,
FiduciaryDuties].
230 See HANSMANN, supra note 93, at 149-68 (discussing consumer ownership); Yosifon,
Lock-in, supra note 216, at 1449-59 (discussing types of lock-in situations).
231 See Tung, FiduciaryDuties, supra note 229, at 842 ("By the time the firm is in distress, its
creditors will enjoy differing rights (including payment and priority rights), differing stakes in the
continuation of the borrower firm, and differing contract protections.").
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quirements on firms. 232 Environmental protections address externalities by
imposing costs on firms (and individuals) for creating those externalities. 233
But corporate governance, like all firm governance, should be addressed by
solving problems that arise within the firm structure-problems related to
team production. 234 Employees and shareholders are the stakeholders engaged in the process of team production within the firm. 235
2. Information Within the Firm
A system of shared governance better reflects the flow of information
within the firm. Information has always been the strange paradox at the
heart of corporate law theory. Shareholders delegate governance power to
management because they do not have the time or resources to get the information necessary to make independent governance decisions. And yet
shareholder primacy asks shareholders to vote with sufficient knowledge
and understanding to curb agency costs and direct the corporation efficiently. This paradox has come into fuller view of late, as theorists raise powerful concerns about the "competence costs" of principal governance236 and
the voting rights of passive funds. 237
Employees have information about the firm that they obtain through
their everyday experience with the company without additional cost. Yet
they have no formal governance mechanisms for using this information to
232 Cf Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the Institutionaliza-

tion of Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1147, 1169 (2010)
("Despite the many state and federal statutes that have been enacted in the last forty years to regulate consumer transactions, the underlying contract between the company and the consumer remains crucial in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties.").
233 Individual shareholders at individual companies can no doubt use corporate law and governance to advance environmental concerns. See Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as
Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 140 (2019) (concluding that "the law governing the
corporation throughout its life cycle corporate law, securities regulation, antitrust law, and bankruptcy law should be understood as a fundamental part of environmental law"). For a discussion
of the use of voting power to provide stakeholders with influence in benefit corporations, see Brett
H. McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure to Power and Participation in Social Enterprise, 70
ALA. L. REV. 77, 124 (2018).
234 See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 250 ("[P]ublic corporation law can offer a second-best
solution to team production problems because it allows rational individuals who hope to profit
from team production to overcome shirking and rent-seeking by opting into an internal governance structure we call the 'mediating hierarchy."').
235 Note that a shared governance structure for the firm would align with William Bratton's
description of the corporate purpose: "corporate law should facilitate corporate attempts to maximize productive output (and hence wealth) in a competitive economy, encouraging long-term
investment at the lowest cost of capital, subject to exterior regulations that control externalities."
William W. Bratton, Framing a Purposefor Corporate Law, 39 J. CORP. L. 713, 723-24 (2014).
236 Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 785-90.
237 Lund, supra note 6, at 497.
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help guide the company. The overwhelming majority of private sector employees are not represented by a union. 238 Even if employees are represented by a union, that union has no formal right to bargain with the company
over issues of managerial prerogative, such as new product lines, marketing, acquisitions, or the composition of the board. 239 The formal mechanism
for employee input is the proverbial suggestion box.
In the 1980s and 1990s, both academic and popular business literature
explored ways in which firms could better process and utilize information
held by employees. 240 The success of Japanese businesses led many to investigate ways in which Japanese firms better integrated employee decision-making. 24' Internal systems involving "quality circles" and "quality
improvement teams" were heralded as a way of drawing employee knowhow into daily operations. 242 Such methods stood in opposition to hierarchical management structures and the Taylorist method of production,
which held that managers generated the information and disseminated it
down the ladder. 243 Although many of these structures are in use today, 244
they almost never extend to the higher reaches of the corporation, where
true power sits.
238 Union Members Summary, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.bls.

gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm [https://penna.cc/X6D6-CA4G] (finding that 6.2% of privatesector employees are unionized).
239 Employers only need to bargain about terms and conditions of employment;
they need not
discuss areas within the "core of entrepreneurial control." NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (discussing the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining);
SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MATTHEW T. BODIE, LABOR LAW 144-50 (2d ed. 2020).
240

For a sampling of the legal academic literature

much of it involving employee owner-

ship-see MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995); JOSEPH R. BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP:
REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF? (1988); HANSMANN, supra note 93, at 66-119; THE NEW RELATIONSHIP: HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION (Margaret M. Blair & Thomas A.

Kochan eds., 2000); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE (1990); Alan Hyde, In Defense ofEmployee Ownership, 67 CHI-KENTL. REV. 159, 160 (1991).
241 See, e.g., ROBERT E. COLE, WORK, MOBILITY, AND PARTICIPATION: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE INDUSTRY (1980); Jon Gertner, From 0 to 60 to World

Domination, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 18, 2007, at 34.
242 See, e.g., JOSEPH M. JURAN, JURAN ON QUALITY BY DESIGN (1992); DAVID I. LEVINE,
REINVENTING THE WORKPLACE: HOW BUSINESS AND EMPLOYEES CAN BOTH WIN (1995); PAUL
LILLRANK & NORIAKI KANO, CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT: QUALITY CONTROL CIRCLES IN JAPANESE INDUSTRY (1989); Erin White, How a Company Made Everyone a Team Player, WALL

STREET J., Aug. 13, 2007, at B1.
243 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities,55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 143-46 (1988) (discussing Taylorism in
the workplace).
244 New managerial methodologies providing for participatory management and employee
voice are increasingly popular around the globe. See, e.g., LALOUX, supra note 15; ROBERTSON,
supra note 15.
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This gap between knowledge on the employees' part and power on the
shareholders' part seems inefficient. Shareholders and employees could
work together to pool their information and their power to police decisions
of management. To take just one example: the process of carrying out a corporate combination, such as a merger or sale of substantially all of a corporation's assets, generally follows a prescribed pattern. After some set of the
top corporate officers agree to the deal, the companies secretly and expeditiously conduct due diligence using high-level management and outside
consultants. If this hastily-conducted due diligence uncovers no problems,
the boards approve the combination and announce the deal to the public and
shareholders. The shareholders generally have a couple of months to digest
the proxy materials and media reports before they vote to approve or quash
the merger. If the combination receives shareholder and regulatory approval, the combination ultimately goes into effect. 245 There are strategic reasons
for the structure of this process: secrecy prevents poaching and keeps failed
negotiations under the rug. 246 While this secrecy serves a purpose, it also
narrowly restricts both the information and the perspectives that can be
brought to bear. As a result, corporate combinations are extremely top-down
affairs. From start to finish, the typical corporate combination is hampered
by the absence of critical information. Employees are a natural fit to help
overcome this information deficit because they have specialized information from the shop floor that is often undervalued by expensive corporate
consultants.247
Employees also have information about the agency costs associated
with managerial opportunism-information that shareholders are not likely
to have. While directors may be expected to police such opportunism, there
are a variety of reasons to doubt their effectiveness. First, the directors
themselves may be in on the deal; the firm may decide to award bonuses to
directors as well as managers. 248 Second, directors may already feel beholden to managers. Top-level executives have significant power over the board

245 For a discussion of this phenomenon in the context of the AOL-Time Warner
merger, see
Bodie, supra note 133.
246 See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234-35 (1988) (discussing the importance
of keeping merger negotiations secret).

247 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE:

POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY 231-36 (1984) (discussing the practice of "flexible specialization"
on the shop floor); see also MIKE ROSE, THE MIND AT WORK: VALUING THE INTELLIGENCE OF

THE AMERICAN WORKER, at xxxiv (2004) (discussing the various intelligences of different types
of workers).
248 See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 331-33 (Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing the issues
surrounding a stock option grant to directors).
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nomination and reelection process249 as well as the directorial compensation
Personal ties help cement the feelings of loyalty and friendprocess.
ship. 25 ' Third, directors are part-timers; they themselves do not have the
same quantity and depth of information that employees have. Boards may
end up trusting that investment bankers, compensation consultants, and other advisors dealt with the compensation issue sufficiently, when in fact
these advisors have their own set of conflicts.252
Although their interests may diverge in other contexts, employees are
ideally situated to join with shareholders in an effort to police management.
Indeed, this already appears to be taking place. Labor unions, for example,
have become much more involved in traditional corporate governance activism. 25 3 In the 1980s, unions were generally antagonistic to shareholder concerns and supported anti-takeover tactics such as constituency statutes. 254 Unions and union-associated pension funds, however, have joined the side of
shareholders in pushing through shareholder-friendly corporate governance
measures.25 5 Pension fund managers have been at the forefront in governance
efforts to strengthen shareholder voting rights, 256 rein in the power of the
chief executive officer,25 7 and fight fraud and abuse by insiders. 258 These
measures suggest an ongoing role for union activism: an alliance with shareholders in an effort to maximize long-term growth for shareholders and other
249 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 25-27 (2004).
250
251

Id. at 27-31 (discussing how top-level managers can financially reward directors).
Brian G.M. Main, Charles A. O'Reilly III & James Wade, The CEO, the Board of Direc-

tors and Executive Compensation: Economic and PsychologicalPerspectives, 4 INDUS. & CORP.

CHANGE 292, 304 (1995).
252 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 249, at 37-39; see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 704-11 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (discussing the
process through which Michael Ovitz was hired by the Walt Disney Company in 1995). Despite
denying the duties of care and good faith challenges against the Ovitz hiring, Chancellor Chandler
acknowledged that "the compensation committee met for one hour" to discuss the terms of Michael Ovitz's compensation along with the compensation packages for various Disney employees,
121 stock option grants, top-level executive Robert Iger's employment agreement, and board
member and compensation committee chair Irwin Russell's $250,000 "compensation for negotiating the Ovitz deal." In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 708.
253 See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998).
254 Id. at 1036.
255 Id at 1045. ("The amazing thing about these union-sponsored shareholder proposals is
how ordinary they are, from the perspective of any institutional investor."). See generally DAVID
WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR'S LAST BEST WEAPON

(2018) (describing a wide-range of shareholder initiatives undertaken by public-union pension
funds).
256 WEBBER, supra note 255, at 45-78.
25
1 d. at 111-51.
258 Id. at 164-80.

Boston College Law Review

2462

[Vol. 61:7

stakeholders. Employee board representation would provide a conduit for this
kind of agency-costs information for the ninety-three percent of private-sector
employees who are not represented by a union. 2 9 Whether unionized or not,
employees have an interest in working with shareholders to prevent executives from taking advantage of the other stakeholders in the company.
Consumers, suppliers, creditors, and other stakeholders-unlike employees-all sit outside the firm and are less likely to have the breadth and
depth of understanding that employees have. These stakeholders will have
some slice of information about the firm by dint of their market relationships, and in certain circumstances those relationships may justify limited
governance input or even governance rights. 2 60 As a matter of course, however, employees are much more likely to hold information that would usefully contribute to the governance process and be in a position to share it.
The theory of the firm separates those who engage in the ongoing
business of the firm from those who contract with the firm from the outside.
Those inside the corporation should have their preferences captured through
more direct governance mechanisms such as voting and those outside
through processes like contract or regulation. Under this understanding of
the firm, employees are the classic insiders, a conclusion that's only reinforced by more recent work on the generation and flow of information within firms. The economic theory of the firm, then, provides a powerful argument for extending the corporate franchise to employees.
III. DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION AND

SHARED GOVERNANCE

When it comes to the corporate franchise, the theory of the firm provides a solid economic foundation for separating the interests of shareholders and employees from those of other corporate constituents. It is not,
however, the only theoretical justification for that separation. In this Part,
we explore the lessons that democratic theory has to offer corporate governance. In particular, we look at governance from the broad perspective of
preference aggregation and develop a theory of democratic participation
that allows us to determine whose preferences are best captured through
voting rather than contract. We then apply that framework to corporate governance and find that it, too, counsels in favor of shared governance between shareholders and employees.

259 Union Members Summary, supra note 238 (finding that 6.2% of private-sector employees
are unionized).
260 For a discussion of various ownership structures for different types of
firms, see HANS-

MANN, supra note 93.
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A. Corporations and Democracy
All of the institutions that comprise modern market-based societiesfrom large governments to small businesses-employ decision-making
structures designed to take account of their constituents' preferences. They
sometimes rely on compacts or contracts, which are thought to ensure the
preference satisfaction of everyone involved.261 Once institutions reach a certain size and complexity, though, contracts alone cannot do the job: they must
resort to some type of voting mechanism to aggregate preferences. This is
true of almost all institutions, both political and corporate, that claim to serve
some sort of constituency. It is certainly true of the modern corporation.
Since corporate governance involves, at least in part, the use of voting
mechanisms to aggregate preferences, it seems reasonable to turn to political theory in analyzing its structures and relationships. Public choice theory,
with its emphasis on the interests of different groups and its analysis of the
effect of different structures on outcomes, would seem to present a natural
methodology for studying corporate governance. 262 More generally, political theory concerns the allocation and transfer of power in decision-making
and the roles of different institutions in the governance of a polity. That
said, economics, so far, has dominated corporate law to the almost complete
exclusion of political theory, perhaps because corporate law theorists are
sometimes suspicious of political analogies (despite borrowing what they
think is useful). 263 And while we obviously think economics has its place in
the discussion, politics may also be instructive at the fundamental level of
the structure of the corporation.
This is not to say that political and corporate institutions, or political
and corporate voting, are the same thing. For example, those who currently
vote in corporate elections-shareholders-may enter and exit the corporation more freely than citizens can move between polities; and shareholder
voting, as currently structured, is a relatively meaningless exercise in terms
261 See, e.g., Stephen E. Ellis & Grant M. Hayden, The Cult ofEfficiency in Corporate Law, 5
VA. L.
& BUS. REV. 239, 248-49 (2010).
262

See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991)

(discussing the public choice theory, its incorporation of interest groups, and its application to
public law).
263 See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 256-57, 323-24; Ian B. Lee, Citizenship and the Corporation, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 129 (2009) (discussing how economic theory has dominated
corporate law and arguing that political theory should play a larger role). Public choice theory has
been used in corporate law in the context of competition between states, competition within states,
and competition between the states (particularly Delaware) and the federal government. See, e.g.,
RALPH K. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV.

469, 469-73 (1987); Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2493 (2005).
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of exerting influence over most corporate decisions. 264 These points are well
taken. But at some level of generality, both types of institutions purport to
have governance structures designed to aggregate preferences. The purpose
of a system of governance is to manage different interests despite the opportunities for conflict. 265
For that reason, examining how voting works in political institutions
may help illuminate some of the arguments around corporate governance
law. 266 The disagreements over corporate governance law, after all, aren't
usually about whether to structure corporations to maximize the preference
satisfaction of their constituents, broadly defined, but rather how best to do
so. The same types of questions animate discussions of both political and
corporate voting.
One central set of questions, of course, is which constituents count,
and how do we identify them and best capture their preferences. But there
are other, related questions as well. Should the voting system be direct, representative, or some mixture of the two? If representative, what is the basis
for representation, and how responsive should the system be? Existing work
on these questions in the political realm can help us think about the structure of governance within the corporation.
1. Interested Parties
The right to vote is seen as the most basic of political rights. 267 Voting
is a way of integrating preferences into a governance system. Systems that
aggregate preferences typically limit input to people who have a stake or

264 Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1397-1404 (2006).
265 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 43 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982) (defining
faction

as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community"); see also David
Ciepley, Is the U.S. Government a Corporation?The Corporate Origins of Modern Constitution-

alism, 111 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 418, 431-32 (2017) (making a connection between the structure of
corporate charters and colonial charters).
266 Michael S. Kang, Shareholder Voting as Veto, 88 IND. L.J. 1299, 1325 n.144 (2013) (analogizing the theory of shareholder voting as veto to consociationalism, which "is a system of national governance that permits rival socio-ethnic groups a mutual veto . . over sensitive issues of
government policy").
267 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) ("The right to vote freely for the
candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that
right strike at the heart of representative government."); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 61
(1971) (describing political liberty as "the right to vote and to be eligible for public office").
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interest in the enterprise. 268 When possible, the degree of input may be calibrated with the weight of that interest, or the strength of those preferences. 269 We aggregate the preferences of interested parties to ensure more
thoughtful decision-making and lend a measure of legitimacy to electoral
outcomes. And, indeed, most discussions of governance systems-corporate
and political-take it for granted that input should be limited to those with
an interest in the enterprise. 270 After that, though, the disagreements start
almost immediately. They resolve into a couple different issues. First, who
has interests that are sufficiently substantial to merit some kind of input into
the future of the enterprise? Second, how are those interests best captured:
through mutual agreement, voting, or some mixture of the two? 2 71
The modern corporate structure dictates that the shareholders have
their preferences captured through voting-primarily by voting on boards
of directors, but also, in some cases like mergers or dissolutions, more directly-and all other constituents, from employees to suppliers to customers, have their preferences captured largely through individual agreements. 272 From the perspective of preference aggregation, voting is used to
capture an ongoing set of preferences that are then translated into a system
of governance for the firm. As an institutional entity, the firm needs a process whereby it can make decisions, effectuate actions, and carry on business. The shareholders have been designated as the body politic whose
preferences are collated through various voting procedures.
The basic corporate stakeholders-those with an interest in firm decision-making-are fairly well known. Employees, shareholders, suppliers,
customers, contractors, and even the community at large all have interests in
the operation of a typical corporation. The nature of their interests, of
course, may vary tremendously between groups and, as we've seen before,
even within groups. 273 This is true both with respect to the content of their
preferences (what they care about) and the strength of the preferences (how
much they care about it). With few exceptions, both democratic and economic

&

268 See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Salyer, Ball, and Holt: Reappraisingthe Right to
Vote in Terms
of Political "Interest" and Vote Dilution, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV 1, 38-39 (1982); Hayden
Bodie, supra note 24, at 452-56; Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One Person, One Vote,
102 MICH. L. REV. 213, 251-61 (2003).
269 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 456-58; Hayden, supra note 268, at 248.
270 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 452-60, 463-64.
271 These two questions are not unrelated, but in order to think through some of the issues
here, we think it helps to keep them separated.
272 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (describing Easterbrook and Fischel's argument that other constituents, through their own contracts, have agreed to give voting rights to
shareholders).
273 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (describing the wide range of interests that
shareholders have).
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theorists take the contents of preferences as they come. In politics, for example, we don't prevent people from voting because of whom they support or
what they believe. 274 Standard economics treats preferences much the same
way, or, if anything, elevates them to an even more exalted position. Revealed
preference theory holds that the best way to tell what consumers want is to
observe their purchasing decisions. 2 75 Economists do not typically claim that
consumers didn't (or shouldn't) really want something-they just register
existing preferences and build their theories accordingly.
The strength of constituent interests is a different matter. While we
don't tell citizens or consumers what to care about, we do make basic decisions about the structure of governance based on how much we think they
care and how much they have at stake in the outcome of government or firm
decision-making. Ideally, in both polities and corporations, we figure out
who has strong interests in the enterprise and assign them the right to vote-a
voice in the governance process. 276 Those with a sufficient level of interest
vote; those with even more interest may get some type of additional weight
added to their vote. 277 We believe that those with strong preferences about a
matter are the ones who deserve to have their preferences aggregated.
Though it makes sense as an initial matter to tie voting to preference
strength, we immediately run into a problem: we do not have a foolproof
way to measure the strength of anybody's preferences.278 We could, of
course, just ask people how strongly they felt about an election outcome.
But, with voting or, more generally, governance, tied to interest, people
would have an incentive to strategically misrepresent the strength of their
preferences. And even if we had accurate reports from people about how
strong their interests were in an election, we lack a method of neutrally
comparing those reports to those of others who report having an interest.
There is no universal scale upon which to measure people's preference

274 For example, this is the intuition that underpins Kenneth Arrow's condition
of democratic
fairness typically referred to as universal admissibility. See Grant M. Hayden, Some Implications
ofArrow 's Theorem for Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L. REV. 295, 298 (1995); see also WILLIAM H.

RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 217 (1982).
275 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-BasedLegal Policy, 89 NW. U. L. REV.
4, 4-6 (1994).
276 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 452-60, 463-64.
277 See id. at 456-58; Hayden, supra note 268, at 248.
278 But cf Christopher S. Elmendorf & Abby K. Wood, Elite
PoliticalIgnorance: Law, Data,

and the Representation of (Mis)PerceivedElectorates, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 571, 574 (2018)

(noting that "[r]ecent technological developments . . and the application of ever more sophisticated machine-learning algorithms to merged voter, consumer, and social media databases may,
before long, yield a vastly more detailed and accurate picture of voter preferences").
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strength-no way, in other words, to carry out interpersonal utility comparisons in a completely objective manner. 2 79
For these and other reasons, our political system has not generally relied upon first-person reports to assess preference strength and, thus, the
right to participate. Instead, it has relied upon other proxies, or markers, for
a person's interest in the outcome of an election. 28 0 Throughout our history,
states have relied on a wide variety of such markers, such as propertyholding, taxpaying, or residency. 281 Ultimately, the decision is this: whether
the person, based on certain factors relative to their person, should have the
right to participate in governance.
2. Marking Voter Interest
The search for a good marker for voter interest boils down to finding
an indicator that is both accurate and manageable. 282 The accuracy of a
marker is a measure of how well it picks out the group of people who have
a sufficient interest in the outcome of an election. A marker could be off by
either including too many people who lack a sufficient interest or excluding
people who have a strong interest; in other words, it could be overinclusive
or underinclusive. With an overinclusive marker, we risk extending the
franchise to those with a weak or nonexistent interest in the election, thus
diluting the votes of those with a stronger interest. An underinclusive marker is even worse: it leads to outright disenfranchisement of those with a real
stake in the outcome. 28 3 When it comes to assigning weight to votes, the
accuracy of the marker depends on whether and how well it can be calibrated to the strength of voter preferences.

279 For a summary of the problem of making interpersonal utility comparisons, see Hayden,
supra note 274, at 236-47; Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REv.
2121, 2129 (1990) (discussing the difficulty of "democratic voting rules or procedures for collective decision making [that] would be able to aggregate existing individual preference rankings into
a single, consistent collective outcome"). For more general background in the area, see JAMES

GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 113-20 (1986).
See generally INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer

eds., 1991); Peter J. Hammond, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and How They Are
and Should Be Made, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra, at 200, 238-

254.
280 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 454.

281 See id. at 454-56; Hayden, supra note 268, at 255-59;
cf Paul David Meyer, Citizens,
Residents, and the Body Politic, 102 CALIF. L. REv. 465, 468 (2014) (arguing that lawful permanent residents should have voting rights).
282 For an extended discussion of this, see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 460-62.
283 See id. Of course, we could stitch together more than one underinclusive marker and better
capture voter interest.
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Of course, we have no direct way of assessing the accuracy of any
marker because, as mentioned above, we have no direct way of measuring
and comparing preference strength to begin with. Instead, as in any other
situation, we have to make educated guesses about how much various people are affected by the decision-making of a particular elected body and assume that the people more strongly affected will be those with stronger
electoral preferences. These judgments about the strength of people's interest may be contested, but they are essential to get any voting system up and
running.
We make these kinds of judgments all the time in the political arena.
The early freehold requirements, for example, were an attempt to capture
one's stake in an election, and they were fine as far as they went (that is,
those with a large amount of property did have an interest in elections). But
they were underinclusive because they disenfranchised large numbers of
property-less people who were, nonetheless, also greatly affected by the
exercise of governmental powers. 284 More contemporary requirements, such
as residency and citizenship, seem like better (though still imperfect) markers of voter interest. For example, those who are residents within the jurisdiction of a particular government are subject to its police powers, taxation, and
services, and thus have quite a bit at stake in an election. Residency isn't a
perfect indicator, of course. It's a little underinclusive, in that it fails to capture those who work or own property in one place and reside in another. At
times, it can also be overinclusive, as when it allows people to vote who
plan to move out of town right after election day. But despite debates
around the margins, most agree that residency is a more accurate marker for
voter interest than, say, owning property. 28 5 And, in the United States, when
state and local governments tinker too much and try to use markers that are
too overinclusive or underinclusive, they are often disallowed from doing
so for that very reason. 286 New York, for example, attempted to limit voting
in certain school district elections to people who either had school-aged
children or owned or leased taxable property in the school district. 287 The
United States Supreme Court, in addressing New York's attempted voting
limitation in Kramer v Union Free School DistrictNo. 15, acknowledged that
voting may be tied to interest, but struck these particular markers as both
284

See id. at 461.
See id.
286 See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 79 (1974); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969); Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 55-56 (D. Me. 2001); Hellebust v. Brownback, 824 F. Supp. 1511, 1519-20 (D. Kan. 1993); Ortiz v. Hernandez Colon, 385
F. Supp. 111, 118 (D.P.R. 1974), vacated, 429 U.S. 1031 (1977) (mem.).
287 See Kramer, 395 U.S. at 622-24.
285
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overinclusive and underinclusive. 288 The Court explained that "[s]tatutes
granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose the danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs
which substantially affect their lives." 28 9
Of course, we could always come up with some more extensive survey
of voter interest to get a better fix on whether any particular person has a
strong interest in the outcome of an election. 290 For example, perhaps a survey reveals that while both Luke and Ben are residents of a certain town,
Ben plans to move away in just a few weeks. A third potential voter, Milo,
lives nearby, but works and owns property in town, including the house
where his elderly, dependent mother lives. With such information, we might
conclude that, while residency is a good starting point, our additional information reveals that, really, Luke and Milo have sufficient interest in the
jurisdiction to vote, and Ben, despite his current residency, does not. But
this kind of individualized preference information would be incredibly costly to obtain, much less keep up to date. And, of course, if we obtain this
information by asking everyone about their interests, we'd worry about strategic misrepresentation. 29' But, in any case, an ongoing process of surveying everyone about their potential interests in every jurisdiction is simply
unworkable, which brings us to the second feature of any good marker: its
manageability. 292
Democratic institutions have long valued markers for voter interest that
are easily managed. The property-holding and taxpaying requirements of old
were not only useful because they ensured that voters had a financial stake in
election outcomes, but did so with information that was readily available to
the state. In fact, the state and local governments that ran the elections usually
had lists of both property holders and taxpayers, which made it very easy to
administer the voter rolls. 293 Residency has been a little harder to pin downstate and local governments do not usually have ready lists of all of their residents-so residency is often confirmed by requesting some sort of identification with a name and address on it (a utility bill, for example). Nevertheless,
if one's residency is questioned, it is ultimately something that can be easily
confirmed. Manageability, then, is a key feature of any marker used to pick
out a potential voter's interest in the outcome of an election.

2

88

289

Id. at 632 n.15.

Id. at 626-27.
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 462.
291 See id.
292
See id. at 461.
293 See id.
290
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B. Who Should Vote?
Developing a method of aggregating individual preferences, then, demands that we first figure out whose preferences to aggregate. This typically involves finding some way to measure the level of interest that a potential voter has in the outcome of an election. Because we do not have direct,
reliable access to that kind of information, we usually depend upon some
sort of marker for that interest. We generally divide the electorate into those
whose preferences can be expressed through voting, and those whose preferences cannot. Until now, corporate governance has allowed only shareholders to express their preferences through votes. But it is time to reexamine this reality.
As detailed earlier, the longstanding theory of the firm counsels that
two groups of constituents-shareholders and employees-have a special
relationship to the corporation that militates in favor of assigning voting
rights to them. This provides symmetry between contribution and participation. In this Section, we argue that core features of democratic theory-the
tie between voting and interest, and the accompanying need for markers of
that interest-point in the same direction. Here, too, there are features of
shareholders and employees that allow us to distinguish them from other
stakeholders. Most simply, their relationship with the firm gives them the
accurate and manageable markers of interest that other corporate constituents, in ordinary business situations, lack.
1. Shareholders
For shareholders, the value of the capital contribution and the percentage of the dividend interest provide fairly quantifiable measures of the
shareholder's interest in the corporation. Putting aside any outside interests
of the shareholder, the allocation of one vote for each share accurately correlates to the shareholder's financial interest in the corporation. 294 The system of one share, one vote calibrates the level of interest with the level of
input. Shareholding, in other words, appears to be an accurate and manageable marker of interest in a corporation, and thus shareholders should be
accorded voting rights.
The familiarity of this conclusion, however, belies the complicating
factors of this democratic argument for shareholder voting. Although shares
are originally sold for the same price during the initial public offering, public294 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 72 ("The most basic statutory rule of voting
is the same in every state. It is this: all common shares vote, all votes have the same weight, and
no other participant in the venture votes, unless there is some agreement to the contrary. Such
agreements are rare.").
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ly traded shares soon enter the marketplace, where their values may change
drastically over time. One shareholder may have purchased Facebook shares
for $30 in 2012, while recent shareholders may have paid over $200.295 Although everyone's shares may have the same value at any given moment in
time, individual shareholders have likely invested different amounts per
share to obtain those shares (and votes).
Shareholders also have differing interests outside the firm. Those outside interests may swamp the shareholder's interest in the corporation's residual. Shareholders may tailor their financial holdings to match shareholder voting power with countervailing interests in derivatives or short positions.296 They may have personal interests, such as family ties 297 or religious
and political values, 298 that conflict with the principle of shareholder wealth
maximization. The shareholders themselves may be social investing funds, 299
sovereign wealth funds, 300 or an algorithm. 301Pension funds may want to
promote worker power, while hedge funds may want to make a quick sale
after juicing up the price. Shareholders do not have "pure" interests as
shareholders, no more than citizens have "pure" interests in the republic.
There is also an accuracy issue when it comes to measuring shareholder preferences in that it may not be worth the shareholder's time and investment to correlate the vote in question accurately with the shareholder's
preferences. The shareholder interest for those holding only a few shares is
rather weak. The move to passive index funds further removes the shareholder's interests from any effort to express those interests through a
vote. 3 02 Fully diversified shareholders are close to indifferent to the fortunes
of any particular corporation.
295 Cf Matt Phillips, Facebook'sStock Plunge Shatters Faith in Tech Companies' InvincibilN.Y. TEms (July 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/business/facebook-stockearnings-call.html [https://penna.cc/982M-ZDZS].
296 See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 816 (2006); Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy,
Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 780 (discussing "economically encumbered" and
"legally encumbered" shares).
297 Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1185
(2013).
298 See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733 (2005).
299 See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social

ity,

Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381

(2020).
... See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A MinimalistResponse to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2008).
3' See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 680 (2013).
302 See Lund, supra note 6, at 497 (proposing that lawmakers should restrict
truly passive
funds from voting at shareholder meetings because of their lack of interests in voting).
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There are also underappreciated difficulties in the manageability of
shareholder voting. Shareholder governance is still centered around the idea
of the annual shareholders meeting, which the corporation, in theory, expects the shareholders to attend. 303 If unable to attend, shareholders designate their voting power to proxies, who then act on their behalf. Shareholders receive proxy ballots from the incumbent board, which makes the process much easier while subverting its democratic nature. Add to this the fact
that modern shareholding is generally managed through intermediaries who
hold the shares on behalf of the actual owner.304 As Ewan McGaughey
pointed out, it's quite often the case that "[a]sset managers control shareholder voting rights with other people's money. "305 Confusion over voting
rights can abound in the context of custodial ownership, short sales, lending
shares, and changes in ownership after the record date. 306 Trading shares is
also accomplished through lightning-fast technology, and the allocation of
particular shares to particular holders has not caught up with this technology. 307 Although certain reforms may address particular uncertainties over
voting rights for particular shares, 308 there remain difficulties in matching
up particular shareholders with voting rights in a particular election.
But despite these concerns, shareholders have sufficiently defined interests to provide accurate and manageable markers for their voting rights.
They have a clear stake in the outcome of decision-making. They have a
straightforward way to calibrate the strength of their interest. And because
shareholders provide unencumbered capital to the corporation in exchange for
certain rights to the residual profits, they cannot register their preferences

303 William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Case Against Mandatory Annual Director Elections and
Shareholders'Meetings, 74 TENN. L. REV. 199, 201 (2007) (discussing the "mandatory requirement under state corporate law and stock exchange listing standards that public corporations hold
annual shareholders' meetings for the election of directors").
304 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the
SharedInterests ofManagers andLabor in a More Rational System of CorporateGovernance, 33
J. CORP. L. 1, 6-7 (2007) (discussing the "separation of ownership from ownership," namely that
"the equity of public corporations is often owned, not by the end-user investors, but by another
form of agency, a mutual fund, or other institutional investor").
305 Ewan McGaughey, Democracy in America at Work: The History of Labor's Vote in Cor-

porate Governance, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 697, 746 (2019).
306 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J.
1227, 1231 (2008) ("The inescapable complexity combined with the already well-studied issues of
shareholders' rational apathy and free rider problems detract from the case for shareholder voting.").
307 George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 227, 228-29
(2018) (noting the failure to connect particular shares with their owners in the context of electronic trading).
308 Id

20201

The CorporationReborn

2473

meaningfully through agreement alone; they need a governance mechanism.
Shareholder voting rights are designed to manage those preferences.
2. Employees
Employment is also an accurate and manageable marker of interest in
the success of a corporation. Employees have an interest in the value of the
corporation as expressed through their continued employment. Workers
contribute to the process of joint production through their labor and create
both specific value (creation of a particular good or service) and longerterm indefinite value (the value of the ongoing business as expressed
through good will, trademark, and share price). Employees receive wages
and benefits and may, in some cases, participate as shareholders through a
401(k) plan. But they also have an interest in the ongoing business of the
company simply by virtue of having a job. This job renders them participants in the ongoing production and entitles them to a voice in the joint
production process through the governance of the firm.
As compared with shareholders, it is simultaneously easier and more
difficult to correlate employment interests with a schema of voting rights
within the firm. Employees are smaller in number, easier to keep track of,
and have an attachment to the firm that makes the logistics of election participation easier to manage. Yet, there are additional factors that could complicate the assignment of particular voting interests to employees. First, the
category of employment is less clearly defined than the category of shareholder. The test for "employment" has traditionally been the common-law
control test, which asks whether the employer has the right to control the
action of the employee within the scope of employment. 309 The test has uncertain boundaries and can result in uncertainty over whether a particular
worker is an employee or an independent contractor. 310 At the same time,
however, corporations officially designate their employees for tax purposes
and withhold employee income taxes.311 This tax designation would be a
309 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1958)
(defining a servant/employee as: "a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with
respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other's control
or right to control").
310 Id. § 220 cmt. c (noting that the employment relationship is "one not capable of exact
definition"); Matthew T. Bodie, Participationas a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 661, 682-83 (2013) ("Courts and commentators continue to bemoan [the control test's]
inability to deliver clear answers.").
31 Firms are expected to differentiate between employees and independent contractors over a
host of provisions, including whether taxes need to be withheld, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3401(c), 3402
(2018), whether the firm must pay a share of Social Security and Medicare, id §§ 3101, 3121(d),
and unemployment taxes, id. §§ 3301, 3306(i), for the worker, and depending on if the workers
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relatively straightforward way to delineate employees in the first instance,
and then workers could contest that designation if they felt improperly excluded from the employment rolls.
Corporations may also struggle over the specific voting rights to be
granted to each employee. The easiest system to administer would allocate
one set of voting rights to each employee. But employees might object to this
allocation along a variety of lines, arguing instead that employees with more
seniority, higher wages, more hours, or greater stature within the company
deserve greater voting rights. Unlike a unit of shares, a unit of "employment"
is not the same for each employee in terms of interest in the firm. The conflict
over the allocation of employee voting rights is one reason why commentators have argued against them. 312
But this disparity between shareholders and employees can also be overstated. As discussed above, shareholder voting rights are not always allocated along the lines of "one share, one vote." Many of the largest and most
prominent companies-Google, Facebook, Viacom-have allocated voting
rights disproportionately among shareholder groups to give a group of
founders, family members, or insiders more power relative to their fellow
stockholders. These companies made this choice based on competing interests in providing more governance to a select group based on that group's
role within the firm. 3 13 Similar analyses could apply in the employee voting
rights context: the company could design a system of voting rights based on
the relative importance of employee voice to the company. 314 For now, corporations would face the choice of a straightforward allocation of employee
voting rights-one employee, one vote-or decide to assign voting rights
based on a more nuanced analysis of employee interests.
One other structural concern with adding employee voting rights into
the corporate governance mix is their potential incommensurability with
shareholder voting rights. If we have one share, one vote on one side, and
one employee, one vote on the other, how will we match up these two sys-

count as employees for benefit plan purposes, id. § 410(a). The IRS defines employees based on
the common-law control test. Id. § 3121(d)(2) (defining an employee as, among other definitions,
"any individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employeremployee relationship, has the status of an employee").
3" Henry Hansmann, Employee Ownership and Unions: Lessons from the Airline Industry, in
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS TO

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 573-80 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1998); HANSMANN, supra note 93.
31 See Lund, supra note 8, at 714-37 (discussing the benefits of a disproportionate voting
structure).
314 Recent innovations in employee participatory governance structures include holacracy and
other participatory (or "evolutionary") management structures. See LALOUX, supra note 15; ROBERTSON, supra note 15.
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tems? How many shares' worth of votes will one employee have? But
matching up two sets of voters is by no means impossible, and it's certainly
not a reason to shut out a group of otherwise qualified constituents from
board elections.
When it comes to allocating voting power between shareholders and
employees, we imagine that most corporations would want to take one of
two approaches. The first would provide for separate systems of voting
rights in which there would be no need to measure commensurability. So,
for example, shareholders would vote for a set of shareholder directors, and
employees would vote for a set of employee directors. The voting rights
would not need to be commensurable as they would be participating in different elections. Both the German system of codetermination 3 15 and bills
recently introduced in the United States Senate track this approach. 316
The second possible system would combine shareholders and employees into a single electorate. The corporation would then have to make a
judgment about how to weight the votes of individual shareholders and employees. Corporations following this approach would probably start with a
judgement about the general allocation of voting power between shareholders and employees, and then translate that into individual voting weights.
So, for example, a corporation could decide that employees should have
roughly forty percent 317 of the voting rights within the corporation, and then
allocate votes between the two groups based on this rough proportion. 318
At this stage, it's enough to say that the logistical challenges are not
insurmountable. 319 More importantly, they do not justify the exclusion of a
set of corporate participants from participation in governance. Employees
are participants in the firm and contribute their efforts to the process of joint

315

Andreas Rihmkorf, Stakeholder Value Versus Corporate Sustainability: Company Law

and Corporate Governance in Germany, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW,

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY 232, 232-45 (Beate Sjafell & Christopher M.
Bruner eds., 2019); Ewan McGaughey, The Codetermination Bargains: The History of German
Corporate andLabor Law, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 135, 136 (2016).
316 Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); Reward Work Act, S. 2605,
115th Cong. (2018); see also ISABELLE FERRERAS, FIRMS AS POLITICAL ENTITIES: SAVING DE-

MOCRACY THROUGH ECONOMIC BICAMERALISM (2017) (discussing a system of bicameralism for
shareholders and employees).
317 Cf Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018) (assigning employees with
voting rights to 40% of the board).
318 One problem with this type of system is that if one group or the other has a majority of the
votes, they can completely dictate the outcomes of winner-take-all elections.
319 The mixed interests of employees and shareholders comes into play in startup companies,
where founders and employees generally have equity positions along with wages and benefits. For
a discussion of the unique governance challenges in new companies poised for growth, see Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155 (2019).
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production. They should not be excluded from governance simply because
we currently have systems in place that find it easier to exclude them.
3. Other Corporate Constituents
The theory of the firm and the theory of democratic participation both
counsel in favor of extending the corporate franchise to shareholders and
employees. Those two groups deserve voting rights because they are within
the economic firm-they participate in a process of joint production as carried on by the firm. They also have the accurate and manageable markers of
interest that allow for the creation of a workable system of corporate governance. The same, however, cannot be said of other corporate constituents.
Along with the theory of the firm, democratic participation theory provides a second means of separating the insiders-shareholders and employees-from other constituents outside the corporation. With most firms, it
doesn't make sense to capture the preferences of creditors, customers, suppliers, and other constituencies though the franchise. This is both because
their interests in the success of the firm are not as significant as those of the
insiders and because their status and relationship with the firm do not provide particularly accurate or manageable markers of that interest. For those
reasons, participation theory generally counsels against extending the franchise to these outside stakeholders.
Take, for example, the customers of a large corporation. Customers
certainly have some relationship with a firm such that they have a stake in,
and preferences regarding, its success. But their interests in the continued
success of the company are more tenuous, and their ongoing contacts with
the company, even assuming the planned obsolescence of the latest product,
are likely to be relatively sporadic. Their status as customers is not a particularly strong marker for interest in the future success of the firm. It's also
not a particularly manageable marker, given that the company's interaction
with the person may be limited to the point of sale, if that; after that, tracking the customers becomes more difficult. 320 The same may be said of a
corporation's suppliers, though the relationship may be a little closer there,
and the markers a little more manageable. Similarly, creditors may have
manageable markers-amount of debt, for example-but they structure
their capital investment as repayable and often secured, while shareholders
provide their equity contributions with no expectation of repayment.

... This may change with the increased online interaction between consumers
and producers,
particularly on social media. See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM

135-37 (2019).
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Of course, there may be certain types of customers, suppliers, or even
creditors who enjoy a continuous and significant relationship with a corporation such that they have a more significant interest and it's easy to identify
them for the purpose of extending the franchise. Some utility customers, for
example, have that kind of relationship with their providers. 32 1And in those
situations, democratic participation theory may counsel in favor of extending them voting rights. 322
Democratic participation theory is certainly flexible enough to deal
with unique customer bases and the possible rise of accurate and manageable markers of constituent interest, and assign voting rights accordingly. 32 3
For now, though, in the regular course of corporate governance, it militates
in favor of extending voting rights to shareholders and employees and leaving the interests of other constituents to contract or government regulation.
C. The German Experience
Shareholder primacy is so deeply entrenched in American corporate
law and scholarship that it's sometimes difficult to imagine any other way
of thinking about the corporation. This lack of imagination may help explain why arguments for the shareholder franchise-despite their shortcomings-continue to plod along in the background of an awful lot of scholarship. There are, however, alternative models, some of which involve employee representation.
The United States may not have much of a history of employee involvement in corporate governance, 324 but a majority of European Union and
OECD countries give employees access to corporate boards.325 Of these,

&

321 HANSMANN, supra note 93, at 168-73 (discussing how rural electrical cooperatives involve ownership by customers); Yosifon, Lock-in, supra note 216, at 1449-59 (arguing that consumers may have ongoing interests through lock-in purchases).
322 In the nineteenth century, shares in companies providing vital infrastructure services such
as transportation, banking, and insurance were often purchased by local merchants and farmers
who used those services. These low-stakes shareholders were protected by restricted voting
schemes which gave their shares more power within the governance structure. Scholars have debated whether these protections were more a form of investor protection or consumer protection.
Compare Dunlavy, supra note 42, at 1354-56 (investor protection), with Henry Hansmann
Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and
Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948, 953-54 (2014) (consumer protection).
323 See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 233, at 124 (discussing the use of voting rights to manage
stakeholder interests within socially oriented business enterprises).
324 For a comprehensive rundown, see McGaughey, supra note 305.
325 For a recent list of countries, see Ewan McGaughey, Votes at Work in Britain: Shareholder Monopolisation and the "Single Channel," 47 INDUS. L.J. 76, 79-80, 79 n.17, 80 fig.1 (2018).
For information on countries outside of Germany, see Klas Levinson, Codeterminationin Sweden:
Myth and Reality, 21 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 457 (2000); Caspar Rose, The Challenges of
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Germany's system of codetermination is perhaps the most well-known. 2 6 It
has also been in place for decades as part of a large, modern economy, making it an exemplar.3 27
Codetermination laws dictate the composition of the supervisory
boards for large German companies. 328 The degree of employee representation depends on a number of factors, including the type of industry, the
number of employees, and a few other factors. 329 Generally speaking, corporations with fewer than 500 employees have supervisory board members
elected by shareholders; corporations with 500 to 2,000 employees must
have one-third of their board members elected by employees; and those
with more than 2,000 employees have one-half of their supervisory board
members elected by employees. 330 Thus, in Germany, we see a longstanding
Employee-Appointed Board Members for Corporate Governance: The Danish Evidence, 9 EUR.
BUS. ORG. L. REV. 215 (2008); Milan Utrosa, Works Councils and Co-Determinationin Slovenia,

1 SE. EUR. REV. 23 (1998); Eivind Falkum, Inger M. Hagen & Sissel C. Trygstad, Participation
and CodeterminationAmong Norwegian Employees (June 2010) (unpublished conference paper),
https://faos.ku.dk/pdf/iirakongres2010/track2/38.pdf [https://penna.cc/D6ZX-V7FT].
326 The term "codetermination" actually describes two very different features of German corporations, and we are using the terminology from Otto Sandrock & Jean J. du Plessis, The German
System of Supervisory Codetermination by Employees, in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN

INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 167, 169 (Jean J. du Plessis et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017).
"Social codetermination" involves employee representation on shop-level works councils at all
companies with at least five employees. See id at 169-71. "Supervisory codetermination," on the
other hand, describes employee representation at the level of the corporate board. See id. at 169.
327 See Robert Scholz & Sigurt Vitols, Board-Level Codetermination: A Driving Force for
Corporate Social Responsibility in German Companies?, 25 EUR. J. IND. REL. 233, 233-34
(2019).
328 See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 326, at 172-78. Germany uses a two-tiered board
system. See Jean J. du Plessis et al., An Overview of German Business or EnterpriseLaw and the
One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems Contrasted, in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 326, at 1, 8-13. Supervisory boards are

roughly analogous to corporate boards in the United States, exercising general oversight of the
company and appointing members of the management board. See Jean J. du Plessis & Ingo
Saenger, The General Meeting and the Management Board as Company Organs, in GERMAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 326, at 63,

73; Jean J. du Plessis & Ingo Saenger, The Supervisory Board as Company Organ, in GERMAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 326, at
105, 133-53. The management board, much like the officers in the United States, run the company
and make the day-to-day business decisions. Thilo Kuntz, German Corporate Law in the 20th
Century, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE AND COMPANY LAW 205

(Harwell Wells ed., 2018).
329 See Sandmck & du Plessis, supra note 326, at 182-83.
330 See JOHN T. ADDISON, THE ECONOMICS OF CODETERMINATION: LESSONS FROM THE

GERMAN EXPERIENCE 103 (2009); Jean J. du Plessis & Ingo Saenger, An Overview of the Corporate Governance Debate in Germany, in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL

AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 326, at 17, 48-49; Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 326,
at 173-78; Otto Sandrock, German and InternationalPerspectives of the German Model of Codetermination, 26 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 129, 131-32 (2015). In most of these large companies with
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example of shared corporate governance, with shareholder and employee
representatives working side by side on the supervisory boards of major
companies.
For decades, codetermination has received little more than passing attention from American corporate governance scholars. 33 ' It shows up most
often in a variant of the contractarian argument for the exclusive shareholder franchise. Codetermination, it is argued, must be inefficient because it
has not been voluntarily adopted by American firms. In fact, the only way a
firm would end up with employee board representation is if you force it to
do so, as Germany does by law. Nobody freely chooses codetermination; it
is therefore less efficient than having shareholders run the show.3 32
one-half codetermination, employees enjoy "quasi-parity" because shareholders elect the chair
(and potential tiebreaker vote). In the coal, iron, and steel industries, however, there is a neutral
chair (and tiebreaker), giving the employees "full parity," or a truly shared system of governance.
See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 326, at 173-76. This is true of companies in these sectors at
a lower threshold 1,000 instead of 2,000 employees. Volkswagen is a special case. Along with fifty
percent representation for the workers, the government of Lower Saxony also has seats on the board,
which gives the workers a de facto majority (because of traditional government support for the workers). In addition, the voting rights of individual shareholders are limited to a maximum of twenty
percent for any particular shareholder. Gesetz Uber die lberflhrung der Anteilsrechte an der
Volkswagenwerk Gesellschaft mit Beschrankter Haftung in Private Hand [Law on the Privatization
of Equity in the Volkswagen Limited Liability Company], July 21, 1960, ELEKTRONISCHER BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGBL] I, at 585, last amended by Gesetz [G], July 30, 2009, BGBL I, at
2479, art. 14c (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-intemet.de/vwgmbh g/BJNR005850960.html [https://
perma.cc/R3VB-DUSJ]; see also JACK EWING, FASTER, HIGHER, FARTHER: THE VOLKSWAGEN
SCANDAL 57 (2017).
33 See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 99, at 47-49 (discussing codetermination for a few
pages); CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 295-96 (Lucian Arye Bebchuk ed., 1990)
(one passing reference to codetermination); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 69
(again, one passing reference to codetermination); HANSMANN, supra note 93, at 110-12 (a few
pages); JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN

230 (2008) (some passing references to the German system). But see EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163-235 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) (a lengthy examination of codetermination).
332 The argument may have been first (and in any case, most forcefully) made by Michael
Jensen and William Meckling in the late 1970s. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Rights and ProductionFunctions: An Application to Labor-ManagedFirms and Codetermination,
52 J. BUS. 469, 473-75, 503-04 (1979). Many other scholars have made variants of the same
point. See, e.g., Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Renier Kmakman & Mariana Pargendler, The
Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholdersand Non-ShareholderConstituencies, in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 79, 106 (John
Armour et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE

LAW 129-30 (1993); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately OrderedParticipatoryManagement: An
OrganizationalFailuresAnalysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1054 (1998) (noting that "German
codetermination was created by sweeping statutory mandates" and concluding codetermination
was unlikely to be adopted through private ordering); George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Governance: A Bad Idea Getting Worse, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1107, 1115 (2008) (arguing that
"[s]takeholder theory has been around for a long time" and that "[i]f it held any promise, some
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In the last few years, however, the key assumption underlying the argument-that codetermination can only arise through fiat, not voluntary
agreement-has itself been revealed to be false. Ewan McGaughey, a legal
historian and economist, recently showed that German codetermination first
arose through collective agreements and only later was enacted into law. 333
This history shows that the American law and economics scholars are not
just wrong on this point, but may have the picture completely backwards:
German codetermination was created by agreement not once but twice,
while the law was sometimes used to quash it. 334 There are also many reasons to believe that a shared system of governance might not emerge from a
free market of industrial relations even if it is more efficient than the existing system. 335
Theoretical arguments aside, how well has codetermination worked in
Germany? Much of the scholarship evaluating the system has centered on
its role in promoting broader goals such as social cohesion and fairness. 336
The bottom-line, economic effects of codetermination are either seen as
secondary or as necessarily following from the achievement of these societal goals. 337 That is, codetermination is viewed less in terms of an economic
system than as one designed to promote a well-functioning democracy and
help prevent social division-in particular, the division between labor and
capital. And, on this broad level, it is thought to be quite successful.
There are, however, a number of studies assessing the economic effects of codetermination, with a consensus that has shifted back and forth

firms would try it"); Hansmann & Kmakman, supra note 2, at 445 ("The growing view today is
that meaningful direct worker voting participation in corporate affairs tends to produce inefficient
decisions, paralysis, or weak boards, and that these costs are likely to exceed any potential benefits
that worker participation might bring."). For the most recent entry in this genre, see Jens Dammann & Horst Eidenmiiller, Codetermination:A Poor Fitfor U.S. Corporations(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 509, 2020), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3565955 [https://perma.cc/4K2Y-UKP2].
333 See Ewan McGaughey, The CodeterminationBargains: The History of German Corporate
and Labor Law, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 135 (2016).
34 See id. at 170.
5 See, e.g., David I. Levine & Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Participation,Productivity, and the
Firm's Environment, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 183 (Alan S.

Blinder ed., 1990) (arguing that codetermination needs to be adopted on a broad scale because
individual firms may find themselves in a prisoners' dilemma with regard to their existing entitlements and constituents); Simon Renaud, Dynamic Efficiency of Supervisory Board Codetermination in Germany, 21 LABOUR 689 (2007) (arguing that codetermination may not emerge because
allocation and distribution may not be separated, information asymmetries may exist, and transaction costs in introducing such a system may be too high).
336 See ADDISON, supra note 330, at 2.
337 See id.
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over the last four decades. 338 Some early studies from the 1980s found that
codetermination had very little impact on corporate performance. 339 Those
studies, however, were criticized on a number of methodological grounds, 34 0
and several more sophisticated evaluations in the 1990s and early 2000s
gave a more pessimistic account, finding that codetermination was associated with, among other things, lower productivity and lower profits. 34 ' That
consensus, though, soon gave way to a third phase in the literature, one that
both reversed the principal findings of the second-phase studies (finding
them to be artifacts of a particular method of assessment) 342 and found that
codetermination was also modestly associated with greater innovation. 34 3 A
couple of modern financial studies on the market value of the firm bolstered
these more optimistic assessments and found that "prudent" levels of employee representation led to better board decision-making by improving

&

338 For the best summary of the literature through 2008 and a discussion of the three initial phases of research detailed below, see id at 108-121; see also Uwe Jirjahn, Okonomische Wirkungen der
Mitbestimmung in Deutschland: Ein Update (The Hans Bockler Found., Arbeitspapier No. 186,
2010), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/116646/l/hbs_arbp_186.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MY2S343].
339 See, e.g., Giuseppe Benelli, Claudio Loderer & Thomas Lys, Labor Participationin Corporate Policy-Making Decisions: West Germany's Experience with Codetermination,60 J. BUS.
553 (1987) (finding no real differences between firms with codetermination and without codetermination across a variety of measures of performance); Michael A. Gurdon & Anoop Rai, Codetermination and EnterprisePerformance: EmpiricalEvidence from West Germany, 42 J. ECON.
BUS. 289 (1990) (finding codetermination led to higher profitability but lower productivity); Jan
Svejnar, Relative Wage Effects of Unions, Dictatorshipand Codetermination: Econometric Evidence from Germany, 63 REv. ECON. & STATS. 188 (1981) (finding codetermination associated
with higher earnings in the iron and steel industry but not in the coal mining industry).
34 See ADDISON, supra note 330, at 109. Those early studies were criticized for reasons that
included "sample size, data frequency (in the case of stock returns), lack of controls for other
relevant economic or organizational variables, focus on a single event, and narrow reach." Id.
341 See, e.g., Theodor Baums & Bemd Frick, Co-determination in Germany: The Impact of
Court Decisions on the Market Value of Firms, 1 ECON. ANALYSIS 143 (1998) (finding that court
rulings that expanded or restricted codetermination had no real effect on share price); Felix R.

FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Economic Effects of Codetermination, 95 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON.

365, 374 (1993) (finding that the shift to quasi-parity codetermination in 1976 had negative effect
on productivity); Gary Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, Capital, Labor, and the Firm: A Study of
German Codetermination,2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS'N 863, 863 (2004) (finding that moving from onethird to quasi-parity codetermination negatively affected shareholder wealth).
342 See, e.g., Felix FitzRoy & Komelius Kraft, Co-determination, Efficiency, and Productivity, 43 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 233 (2005); see also ADDISON, supra note 330, at 115-16, 120. The
negative findings in the second phase of studies may have been artifacts of the cross-section estimation they used, which (by definition) did not control for firm heterogeneity or firm-specific
effects. ADDISON, supra note 330, at 115, 120.
343 See, e.g., Kornelius Kraft, Jorg Stank & Ralf Dewenter, Co-determinationand Innovation,
35 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 145 (2011); see also ADDISON, supra note 330, at 116.
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monitoring and thus reducing agency costs. 34 4 This third, rather optimistic
phase of assessment brought us right up to one of the most profound tests of
all systems of corporate governance: the global financial crisis.
The financial crisis did not spare any of the world's major economies,
but some recovered more quickly than others. Germany, in particular, recovered more quickly and more thoroughly than many other countries, and
did so, at least in part, because of its corporate governance model. 345 While
economic downturns are always difficult for companies and their employees, codetermination allows the management of many companies "to more
easily seek the consent of its workforce for carrying out more or less drastic
measures." 34 6 In Germany, these measures include a system (Kurzarbeit)
that temporarily reduces the working hours (and salaries) of many of the
employees. 347 This avoids painful layoffs and allows companies to retain
their core workforces, which in turn allowed the economy as a whole to
avoid the worst of the economic slump. 34 8 This led one group of scholars to
conclude: "Particular to Germany was the social partners' willingness to
work together during this specific economic hardship . . . . [I]t cannot be
denied that the quality of industrial relations was a factor in overcoming the
crisis." 34 9
A number of new studies came out during and after the period of recovery that were consistent with the third phase of the literature, showing
that codetermination generally had positive economic effects for a variety
of constituents, including shareholders. One of the stronger results came
from a 2020 study by Simon Jager, Benjamin Schoefer, and Jorg Heining,
which showed that shared governance "resulted in positive rather than negative effects on capital formation." 350 This shift toward more capital-inten34

See Larry Fauver & Michael E. Fuerst, Does Good Corporate Governance Include Em-
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sive production may be the result of worker involvement in investment decisions, the fact that worker representatives may have longer-term views
than shareholders or executives, or because shared governance generally
facilitates cooperation between firms and their employees. 351 Shareholders,
it turns out, may be better off investing in firms where employees have a
stronger governance role.
Employees, too, fared better (by their own measures) under codetermination. A recent study by E. Han Kim, Ernst Maug, and Christoph Scheider
confirmed that employees at full-parity codetermined firms are better protected against layoffs during industry downturns.352 This job security, however, comes at the price of significantly lower wages. Employees at codetermined firms pay a premium equal to 3.3% of their wages for this employment insurance. 353 Importantly, this swap of wages for job security has
no effect on shareholders one way or the other.354
Codetermination also benefits other corporate constituents, usually because their interests line up with those of employees. Employee representation, for example, turns out to be good for creditors because both groups are
keenly interested in the stability and long-term survival of the firm. 355 Codetermination is also positively related to a firm's commitment to substantive corporate social responsibility (CSR) measures, including setting concrete goals on emission reductions, the publication of a separate CSR report
(or section in its annual report), and the presence of a job security (nolayoff) policy. 356 These kinds of secondary effects, along with recent performance of the German economy, may have begun to change the way people view codetermination. 357 Indeed, by 2016, its popularity among the
German people rose to an all-time high. 358
So what does all this mean? To start with, the success of the German
system serves as an empirical rejoinder to the hypothetical arguments used
351
352
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by law and economics scholars to justify the exclusive shareholder franchise. Codetermination was born of consensual agreement at a time when
labor and capital had roughly equal bargaining power, and only later became enshrined in law. German firms have not been paralyzed by more heterogeneous board electorates. And they have not been destroyed by voting
cycles. As discussed in Part I, the arguments against employee representation were already in trouble on their own theoretical terms; 359 the presence
of a significant, well-functioning counterexample should be decisive. Those
committed to the proposition that economic and social choice theory somehow dictate the exclusive shareholder franchise need to overhaul their old
arguments or come up with some new ones.
Codetermination also serves as a kind of proof-of-concept when it
comes to our model of shared corporate governance. The arguments we
make in favor of adding employee representatives to corporate boards, just
as the arguments against, are largely theoretical. They necessarily sweep
quite broadly, and don't attend to many of the mechanical details of how to
best structure a shared governance system, much less how to get from here
to there. Germany provides an example of how such a system might work.
And recent research suggests that it is working quite well for a variety of
corporate constituents, including shareholders.
CONCLUSION

We have reached a critical point in the development of the corporation.
Investors, long assumed to be uncomplicated profit-maximizers, are looking
for ways to express a wider range of values in allocating their funds. Employees are agitating for greater say at their workplaces: resisting mandatory arbitration clauses, objecting to corporate expressions of political and
religious views, and questioning the distribution of the profits of their labor.
In turn, state and federal politicians are beginning to respond to these issues
both on their own terms and, more significantly, by thinking more broadly
about the fundamental structure of corporate governance.
At the same time, the intellectual foundations of the modern corporation continue to disintegrate. The law and economics justifications for some
of the core features of the modern corporation, the shareholder primacy
norm and the exclusive shareholder franchise, are exposed. Those arguments, it turns out, rely on flawed assumptions about the nature of shareholder preferences, misapply basic social choice theory, and often contradict
some of the fundamental precepts of standard economics that are purported
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to support them. Their proponents are now at the point where they are unwilling to defend these arguments and yet strangely reluctant to abandon
them, choosing instead to continue to rely on them without comment. The
construction of the modern corporation is under a great deal of pressure,
from within and without.
As we must to move away from the existing corporate order, we need
to acknowledge the shortcomings (and the strengths) of its intellectual
framework and begin to develop new models of firm governance. In this
Article, we cataloged the arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise
and, one by one, found them lacking, usually on their own terms. We then
presented a new model of corporate governance that builds on eighty years
of research into the nature of the firm and finds further support in a new
theory of democratic participation that ensures the proper aggregation of
constituent preferences through accurate and manageable markers. In sum,
this Article sets out the intellectual framework that will allow investors,
employees, and policymakers to navigate the collapse of the shareholder
primacy norm and, at the same time, provides a positive argument for the
inclusion of workers in the future of corporate governance.

